Ukraine fires UK Storm Shadow missiles into Russia & Moscow retaliates with first use of intercontinental missile

I'm Venisha Rainey and this is Ukraine the latest. Today, amid reports of Russia using intercontinental ballistic missiles against Ukraine for the first time, we look at the impact of Kyiv firing British-made storm shadow missiles. Then later, Francis Denley is somewhere in Ukraine speaking with a local MP about his views on a potential peace deal and why Kyiv's use of long-range weapons is well within international law.

Bravery takes you through the most unimaginable hardships to finally reward you with victory. The first duty of my government is security and defence to make clear our unshakable support of NATO and with our allies towards Ukraine. Keep stand strong. Nobody's going to break us. We're strong. We're Ukrainians.

It's Thursday 21st in November, two years and 277 days since the full-scale invasion began. And today I'm joined by podcast regular James Rothwell, the telegraph's Berlin correspondent and a longtime reporter on Ukraine. He's recently been to the Berlin Security Conference and will be telling us all about how Ukraine featured there.

But let's start with some military updates and there's plenty of it about starting with the big news today that Russia has allegedly fired an intercontinental ballistic missile at Ukraine for the first time on Thursday morning. Let's do a quick recap on what an ICBM is. Ballistic missiles are rocket powered and they're launched high into the atmosphere and then sort of arc down back onto their target. They're only actually guided during the initial stages of the launch so they can be less accurate than cruise missiles but they have a very long range

up to about 5,000 kilometers. And they can also reach incredibly high speeds as they approach their targets, which means only certain air defense systems are actually capable of shooting them down. For example, the US-made Patriot system. So let's get into the details. According to Ukraine's Air Force, the attack happened early this morning and it targeted the city of Denipro.

I'm just going to read a quote from them. In particular, an intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from the Astrakhan region of the Russian Federation. A Kinzal-era ballistic missile was launched from a MiG fighter jet from the Tambov region. And seven CH-101 cruise missiles were fired from strategic bombers.

Now, they were quite specific on a lot of the examples there, but they didn't specify what type of ICBM was launched. But yesterday, we did have reports in Russian media that Moscow was preparing to launch an RS-26 Rubezh missile from a site in Astrakhan by the Caspian Sea. That obviously matches up with Ukraine's Air Force report. Now, the RS-26 can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, and it's not been used in combat before, according to Western missile experts.

It's said to fly at five times the speed of sound. That makes it obviously very hard for even the Patriot missile systems to shoot it down. We've had a bit of a mixed bag in terms of confirmation on this today. Russia refused to deny that it fired an ICBM. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Pescov said he had nothing to say on the topic. An unnamed US official has told ABC that it wasn't an ICBM but a shorter range ballistic missile.

And we've had some reaction, for example, from Sakey Astana that if reports are true, it would be another example of depraved, reckless, and escalatory behaviour from Russia. The EU has said that it would be a clear escalation by Vladimir Putin. We'll probably have to wait a little bit longer to see what the truth of the matter of is, but whatever was fired, there has been damage in Dineepro. Footage from overnight shows missiles just raining down on the city.

According to local officials, an industrial enterprise was hit, two fires broke out, and a rehabilitation centre for people with disabilities was damaged. At least two people were injured. Just finally on this, interestingly, there is some footage going round of a Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, getting a call live on air, telling her not to comment on the, quote, Yuzmash ballistic missile strike. Now that suggests Russia's target was a Ukrainian rocket manufacturer known as Yuzmash, who has its headquarters in Denitpro.

No news on whether that was hit, but just an interesting little tip there. So moving on, we're going to look now at Ukraine's use of UK-made precision-guided long-range storm shadow missiles against Russia over the first time ever in the war. And it's a sign of quite how extraordinarily fast events have moved this week, that this is our second item today. So what do we know? Twelve missiles were launched. Russia's defence ministry has claimed that it's shot down two.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, there's some geolocated footage published yesterday that shows that they likely hit a village near Merino, Kursk Oblast. We can see some videos online showing locals picking up debris from the missiles along a tree line street in the village in the Russian border region.

Now, the footage suggests that the target may have been the Bariatinsky estate, a merino, which the Ukrainian defence-focused outlet Defence Express suggests was housing a command post for both Russian and North Korean troops operating in the Kursk Oblast. That would obviously be a significant target for Ukraine to try and hit. The Institute of Study of War can't confirm this claim, but it would make sense in terms of the distance from the Kursk Oblast salient.

Obviously Ukraine was given storm shadow and Atacams both the US earlier last year but wasn't allowed to fire them into Russia until Joe Biden gave the green light last weekend to use these long-range missiles. That's paved the way for the UK to lift its restrictions.

There's been some disquiet in some parts of Eastern Europe over these developments. Hungary, for example, we've learnt today is deploying its air-defence systems near the Ukrainian border. Defence Minister Christov Salzei-Brovozinsky attributed this escalation to the easing of restrictions on Ukrainian strikes with these long-range arms.

He posted a video to Facebook late on Wednesday saying the war has entered its most dangerous phase. We still trust that there will be peace as soon as possible through diplomacy instead of a military solution. However, to prepare for all possibilities, I recently ordered the purchased air control and air defense systems to be installed in the Northeast.

So, related, now, according to Institute of Study of War, along with firing the Stormshadow missiles, Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale drone strike against the Russian rear on the night of November 19th to 20th. This particularly targeted military and defence industrial assets in Vorojna, Belgorod and Novgorod Oblasts.

The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that they destroyed or intercepted 44 Ukrainian drones as I guess the morning. But it's clear that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble these more complex and effective strike packages. So this could really open up some opportunities for Ukraine to leverage its drone attacks, which is already doing very effectively, but to even greater effect with the use of attackums and storm shadows.

Now, I also want to mention some interesting comments by Ukrainian missile and artillery forces Deputy Commander Colonel Serhim Essenko. He was talking recently about Russian innovation and adaptation of the battlefield, in an article published by Ukrainian outlet RBK Ukraine. He said that because Russian forces are facing such severe ammunition shortages, they're increasingly using Soviet-era 122mm and 130mm howitzer's on the battlefield, not ideal,

He also said that Russian forces are changing their assault tactics using small teams of one to two Russian personnel running to cover after which small groups coordinate before launching a subsequent assault. And they're also making use of all sorts of vehicles, armored vehicles, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, and even buggies to quickly approach Ukrainian positions and then engage in these small arms battles.

Two other bits to quickly mention, a brief frontline recap, Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Copiansk, Chassiv-Yar, Torets, Khurakov, Bulidar, and Incursk Oblast. And we should also note that yesterday it was announced that the UK and 12 partnered nations have now trained 50,000 Ukrainian recruits as part of Operation Interflex.

Now, I'm going to hand over to James Rothwell to give us some geopolitical updates. James, what's been catching your eyes so far?

Thanks very much indeed for having me back on the podcast. Why don't we start the geopolitical updates by talking about an interview that President Volodymyr Zelensky has given to my colleague Trey Yinks that Fox News, very interesting interview. And one of the topics that he sort of covers, if you like, is the possibility of a diplomatic solution to Crimea. And what Zelensky said,

is we cannot legally acknowledge any occupied territory of Ukraine as Russian. That is about those territories occupied by Putin before the full-scale invasion since 2014. Legally, we're not acknowledging that. We are not adopting that. And he went on to say, I was already mentioning that we are ready to bring Crimea back diplomatically.

Now, it is worth pointing out that this is not the first time that President Zelensky has said this. In 2022, he told Reuters that Crimea could be returned by diplomatic means. So it's not a U-turn, it's not a sort of change of position from Zelensky's

part. But I think this is interesting because if we look at the bigger picture here, there sort of has been, you might say, shift in tone in terms of what Zelensky is saying about this war. And that's obviously a response to Donald Trump being the victor of the US election. It is widely anticipated that there will be a big change in direction once

the Trump administration takes power, we are told that that is likely to be an administration that pursues a rapid diplomatic solution to this war. And it comes after a previous statement by Mr. Zelensky, where he also really emphasized the idea that there can be a diplomatic solution to the war. It is worth stressing that many Ukrainian officials and much of the Ukrainian public is really skeptical of the idea that Putin is interested in a diplomatic solution. There's a long-running concern that

any so-called peace proposal by Putin might actually be an opportunity to sort of reload and prepare for another go at Ukraine in the near future. So it's a very kind of fraught area of discussions. But it is, I think, significant that Mr. Zelensky has reiterated that view that a solution to Russian-occupied Crimea could be potentially a diplomatic one as well.

I also want to talk briefly about a intriguing piece of reporting that's come up in the cave independent. The headline of this story is alleged Russian plan sees Ukraine cut into three parts, intelligent source says. Now, I should stress that the sourcing on this story is just one anonymous Ukrainian intelligent source, so it is perhaps to be taken with a grain of salt. But the cave independence reporting basically says that what Russia

is wanting to achieve as part of the feature. Negotiated settlement is to split Ukraine into three parts. There would be an eastern region of Ukraine that would be fully annexed by Russia. Western lands would be considered, quote, I'm quoting from the key of independent now, disputed territories that could be claimed by neighboring countries. That's referring to Poland or Romania. And then the remaining territory, the third tranche, if you like, of Ukraine would become, and again, I'm quoting the key of independent.

a Russian-controlled puppet state. This article is to be taken with a pinch of salt, as I said, and Edison's note was added to the story after it was published, which said this story was updated to correct some of the wording, and emphasized that the existence of an alleged plan couldn't be independently confirmed by the key of independence. So I would go so far as saying that's perhaps

the key independent slightly rowing back on its own reporting. But I think it's worth bringing up. We know that the Trump administration is interested in a negotiated settlement, and therefore I think it's worth taking a look at these kind of reports, even if they're just based on one or two sources and applying the usual kind of circumspect attitude and skepticism that this podcast hopefully is well known for.

And then the other sort of topic that I'd like to get into is a piece by Reuters. Reuters is reporting that Vladimir Putin is open to discussing a Ukraine ceasefire deal with Donald Trump, but has ruled out making any major territorial concessions and insist Kyiv Abandons' ambitions to join NATO.

That's a very well-sourced story from Reuters, which has come from fine sources, which have knowledge of what they call Kremlin thinking. And of course, it perhaps states the obvious to some people, but it's just making clear that territorial concessions are apparently a no-go area and that this long-running issue over whether Ukraine should be allowed to join NATO is going to be the kind of opening position by Vladimir Putin.

And I think what we'll move on to now is the intriguing but rather murky story of two fiber optic undersea cables that were severed in the Baltic Sea earlier this week. This was a data cable basically connecting Central Europe to Finland. It was mysteriously cut and immediately Western leaders

were raising the alarm about potential sabotage, without necessarily pointing the finger at Russia at first. Oris Pistorius, the German Defense Minister, said that no one believed that these cables were severed by accident. And I would say as one of the reporters who was on this story early in the week,

The direction of travel certainly seem to be that western powers strongly suspected that Russia was involved in this. There was a joint statement by Poland, Italy, the UK and others, which didn't directly accuse Russia of being behind it, but strongly implied that Russia was behind the cables being severed because it made a particular reference to hybrid warfare. We talked about hybrid warfare a lot on the podcast. As you know, Venetia, it's that attempt to undermine Western democracy, to attack critical infrastructure in the West.

to sabotage equipment in the West that is used to support Ukraine. And so EU powers were kind of without explicitly blaming Russia for this cable incident. We're talking about it being part of the wider context of the hybrid warfare campaign that's being mounted by Russia.

However, perhaps unsurprisingly, the development on this is that the Kremlin has denied that it was behind the severing of those undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. As spokesman said, it is quite absurd to continue to blame Russia for everything without any reason.

Suspicion does actually seem to be shifting away from Russia towards China today and yesterday in terms of the nationality of the vessel that was involved in this incident. As you'll see from our reporting earlier today and last night, the Swedish led investigation into this severed cable is looking at a Chinese vessel.

that was in the area of the cable around the same time that it was damaged. Now, there's not a suggestion that it was necessarily deliberate sabotage. It is, for example, possible that a ship, for example, by dragging an anchor, might perhaps accidentally cause damage to a cable. Experts, by the way, I should add, have expressed skepticism about the idea that you can accidentally sever a cable. But nevertheless, this Chinese vessel is

in the sites of the European investigators who are looking at this case. It's quite a murky story. There are some parallels with the Nord Stream gas pipeline being blown up. My personal suspicion is that it may take some time before anything gets properly confirmed on this story. So we're trying to apply the usual doses of skepticism to it until the situation becomes a bit clearer.

I now want to move on to a story about executions. This is also from the Kyiv Independent. Ukrainian officials are continuing, and this is a bit of a grim story, are continuing to launch investigations into Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war. Now, the Donext Oblast prosecutor's office says it's launched an investigation into cases involving Russian forces who executed two Ukrainian POWs in that Oblast

on November the 10th, so quite recently. And the Ukrainian ombudsman, Dimitro Lubinets, says that Ukraine has returned a total of 3,767 Ukrainians, mostly soldiers and 168 civilians, he says, from Russian captivity, since the start of the forescale invasion. And he says that tens of thousands of Ukrainian military and civilian prisoners remain in Russian captivity. So the Ukrainians are continuing to look into that disturbing

story of the Russians executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. And I'll just end Venetia on some statistics about the US and Germany announcing some further military support for Ukraine. The US Department of Defense has announced a package valued at $275 million. I won't read out the full package. I'm just going to pick up

or pick out rather some of the more interesting bits of kit which are being supplied to Ukraine such as high Mars ammunition, 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds, drones, very important as we all know in this war particularly on the Eastern Frontline, javelins, 84 anti-armour systems, demolitions equipment as well. So that gives you a bit of a flavour of what's being sent over and the German government has also announced

This was all yesterday, by the way, has also announced additional weapons and equipment that's going to Ukraine. And I think the main stuff to pick out from what the Germans are providing is Mardar infantry fighting vehicles, some mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, something of a staple now of this conflict, and 200 various reconnaissance drones. That's quite a large batch of drones, but

as we know, drone warfare, incredibly important part of the kind of nutritional aspect of this conference. So those are the main diplomatic and geopolitical updates that I've got for you today, Venetia. Thanks so much, James. Let's talk a bit about the Berlin Security Conference. You were there this week. It's one of the largest European security and defence policy events. What was the mood like there, given how fast things have moved over the past week?

Yes, so Berlin Security Conference, just to give a bit of context on it, is sort of the younger brother of the Munich Security Conference, which is the much more famous security conference that you have in Germany. It has become, in recent years, a kind of really important

part of the political calendar in Germany. This is a country that prior to the invasion of Ukraine was very reluctant to be a leading voice in security issues, but of course now it is increasingly being looked to as a leader in European security, whether it wants to be one or not, I might add, especially in the context of President Trump returning to the White House and speculation that that will require more leadership from Germany on European affairs. In terms of the mood, what I found quite interesting about this conference is that

Ukraine was discussed, it was discussed in quite broad and vague terms, and the bigger topic of discussion, which of course is very relevant to Ukraine, is the issue of how NATO countries can prepare themselves for a potential war with Russia, regardless of what the outcome of the war in Ukraine might be.

constant theme of the conference where I was watching panel events led by German generals, French generals, senior NATO officers, British naval officers as well were there. The big theme that kept coming through is what can we learn from the Ukrainian battlefield? What are the Ukrainians doing really well that we're not doing?

A couple of points that came up, resilience was something that NATO chiefs and top army officers kept talking about at this conference. They said resilience is really important and what they mean by resilience is the ability of the public at large to deal with sudden shocks.

the emergence of a sudden crisis that they've got to deal with. It's a question of basically psychological strength. That's what it is when we talk about resilience. It's the ability to adapt quickly to a massive, potentially traumatic change in the situation of the country that you live in. Ukraine is obviously a model for this. There was an initial shock and trauma when the invasion happened, but the Ukrainians very rapidly adapted to that new reality.

And I think a lot of Western military leaders are thinking about this because, of course, another theme that came up in this conference is that when you are at war, such as a potential war between NATO and Russia, you're actually going to be hugely dependent on civilians in order to keep your military operation running. Lots of the non-military activity of the army, such as logistics, needs to be supported by civilian infrastructure during a war. And that's a point that was made time and time again.

We did get the opportunity to ask a few questions to some generals at the event, the question of what the German military hopes to see from the next government was raised, and the response that we got, I should say, from one German general was engaging with the question, but not saying anything particularly exciting, you might say, or sort of newsworthy. But what he said was that the German military hopes that a new government will be installed quickly, and that that's almost certainly what will happen, because this is, you know,

German democracy. It is feigned for its efficiency. But the other point that this particular general made was that he hopes that whoever takes power after the election, they continue the trajectory of the Schultz government, which is, of course, putting great emphasis on

the preparation of the German public and the German military for hybrid threats and also potentially conflict with Russia, which, or as Pistorius, the German defense minister has talked about a lot. This idea that NATO may have to fight a war against Russia within five to seven years, that's something that Mr Pistorius and other key defense figures in Germany have been raising for some time now. So there was a lot of talk about resilience. There was a lot of talk about how European

populations can be mentally prepared for a wartime situation, what businesses need to do, how the military and civilian infrastructure can work in tandem. That sort of thing was being discussed rather than any kind of granular detail being discussed about the war in Ukraine. I think that's probably the main takeaways from Berlin Security Conference finish.

That's fascinating. I'm really interested to hear you say how seriously they were taking this idea of the country, Germany being prepared for a potential future war with Russia. Is there a mismatch between the mood in this conference and the mood in Germany at large? Do you feel like the German public are coming around to that idea of a potential future conflict?

Well, I think the best way for me to illustrate that dilemma is what happened when I put a question to a retired German general on one of the panels at this conference. My question was, if a NATO war breaks out on its eastern flank with Russia, Germany will need to host or transit huge numbers of Allied troops on its soil. And my question to this retired German general was basically, is Germany equipped to do that?

The minute I asked this question, there was a sort of ripple of awkward, uncomfortable laughter that ran through this mainly German audience and the retired German general politely declined to answer the question saying that he's now left the German military and he's not in a position.

to discuss its current status. I will leave our listeners to make their own inference from what that exactly means, but it, of course, I think, captures a bit of the public mood in Germany, which is that, frankly, that there is a lot of skepticism still about the idea that Germany is currently in a position to become a major European security leader.

I don't want to talk down too much the idea that Germany could do it because, for example, Boris Pistorius, the defence minister, is really serious about this and he's dedicated a lot of time and energy over the last year in particular to try and raise public awareness of the importance of security. He's been trying

admittedly without much success to bring back conscription, for example. And I'll just give you a very interesting statistic that was read out at one of these panels on military preparedness. It was pointed out that Finland, which has a population of 5.5 million people, when you take into account serving soldiers and its reservists, has got manpower of about 900,000 people.

In contrast, the German equivalent of that is less than 200,000 people in terms of fighting capability, in terms of mass capability of people who can fight. It is quite an extraordinary statistic. Finland, with a population of just 5.5 million people, can mobilize 900,000 individuals, whereas Germany currently, with its vastly larger population, can pull together less than 200,000.

But as I say, work is being done on this. There's a bit of a question mark over who's going to be the next government in Germany and whether they will want to work on it too. But that little vignette that I told you about there about putting that question about preparedness to the panel, I think it reflects that there is a lot of skepticism among the German public as to whether Germany is ready for this.

You mentioned doubts about who will be the next leader of Germany. Boris Pistorius was obviously one of those in the running. And I'm seeing there have been reports this week about calls for Olaf Scholz to step aside so that he can take up the mantel as head of the SPD. How likely do you think that is and how popular is the amongst the German public?

Olaf Scholz is very unpopular amongst the German public at the moment. That is in part due to his perceived failure on key security issues. There's been a lot of anger in Germany about a terrorist attack over the summer in western Germany in Solingen, where a failed Syrian asylum seeker murdered three people at the festival. And this triggered a massive debate on the importance of securing Germany's borders.

It led to Olaf Scholz reintroducing Schengen passport controls at all of Germany's land borders at the start of the autumn. And it doesn't really seem that that move has kind of appeased public anger about what they consider to be a lack of proper German security. The one thing I would say is that there was a state election in the state of Brandenburg quite recently. And I think this really hammers home.

the problem that Olav Scholz has in terms of popularity. His SPD party did win in Brandenburg, contrary to what the expectation was going to be. Lots of people thought the hard right AFD would win in Brandenburg. But there's a suggestion that the only reason the SPD won was because Mr Scholz was basically banned from doing any campaigning over there.

and that the SPD was able to win over their traditional voter base in Brandenburg by basically distancing themselves from the current leader of the party. Now, that's an extraordinary situation for any leader to be in, and it might actually be the death now for some leaders in terms of their political career, but not so with Olaf Scholtz. I mean, he remains leader of the party, as you alluded to, that there is a lot of murmuring

in SBD circles at the moment about getting rid of Olashalts potentially as their Chancellor candidate going into the elections which had been called in February. It's very difficult to predict whether that would actually happen. It's so unusual in German politics for a Chancellor

not to lead their party into the next election. But there is a lot of talk about the idea of the SPD party having a kind of Joe Biden moment where they've got this leader who's considered to be deeply unpopular or politically toxic or whatever excuse you might want to come up with. And so they feel compelled to get rid of them and replace them with someone else rapidly

before the election. Of course it didn't work with the US election and that may have informed the thinking of SPD officials who were sort of teetering on the edge of trying to push Olaf Scholz out of the leadership position of the party. Now Boris Pistorius, his name comes up a lot when SPD circles talk about who they might want to see leading the SPD into the next election.

And Boris Pistorius is a sort of magnificent media performer, and he is very, very popular as well, according to German opinion polls that look at personalities. There is an issue, I think, with Boris Pistorius and the rest of the SPD, which is that he's very much on the more hawkish wing of the SPD in terms of defence and military spending. And one of the huge issues that Ola Scholz has had is that the SPD traditionally is

It's not a Kremlin-friendly party. That would be an exaggeration. But compared to the CDU, it's much more reluctant to take a really tough stance on Russia. And of course, traditionally, it's a center-left party in Germany, which goes back to partition and the DDR. And that's probably part of the picture as well. So it's about to get really interesting. I think the question of whether Mr. Schultz stays in as leader of the SPD. And I'll be happy to give an update on that in a future episode, if there are any big developments.

Absolutely, definitely something we'll be returning to and we'd love to have you back on to talk about it. Finally, I just want to look at some recent developments here in the UK. We had Defence Secretary John Healy speaking at the inaugural Defence Select Committee in Parliament today. And he opened by saying that the frontline in Ukraine is less stable than at any other time since the early days of the war. He was then quickly grilled by members of the UK's Select Committee about when the UK was going to reach its defence spending target of 2.5% of GDP.

Now, he offered very vague language around committing to that path, a strategic defense review needed to happen first, and even when he was pushed on the need for clarity about when and how, he just kept wriggling out of it. There are some worries, and I think that's partly because this comes a day after he announced that he was scrapping six major programs across the UK armed forces worth £500 million. Just quickly read out what that includes, the Army's Watchkeeper Drone program,

The Royal Navy's landing platform docks, couple of ships, the HMS Albion, HMS Bullwock, some wave-class tankers and some old Chinooks and Puma helicopters. I guess the question is for a lot of European countries about getting to these defence spending targets and it comes back to what you were talking about, the main theme at the Berlin Security Conference, being prepared for a potential future conflict with Russia,

How is the debate in Germany playing out around boosting defence spending? Obviously, they've got to 2% of GDP now, but that's very reliant on this special fund, which will expire in a few years' time. I suppose a lot of this hinges on who, as you say, goes on to lead the country next year. And if it's Pistorius, I suppose it's a bit more likely that that target is adhered to. But how are other parties taking on the debate around this target?

Yes, so it is a big part of the German debate. The next German election, arguably the key issue of the next German election, is probably going to be the economy in first place and then probably security in second place, or perhaps even migration in second place and defence in third place. It's not quite clear yet.

It's a really, really tough area, German defence spending at the moment. As you point out, there was a €100 billion fund that was set up in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but that money is running out prior to the collapse of the current coalition government. Even then, there were concerns about the draft budget for 2025, falling well short of maintaining the desired spending level on

defence. So, for example, Boris Pistorius, he says that he'd been trying to get a boost of about €6.5 billion for the 2025 budget, and then he was informed that the draft budget only proposed a sort of much more modest rise of €1.2 billion.

That was before the collapse of the ample, the traffic-like coalition in Germany and the declaration of elections coming early next year. So goodness knows what direction that debate might take next. What I would say is that the CDU, the centre-right party of Germany, famously formally led by Angela Merkel, now led by Friedrich Mers, they are going to be much more hawkish on, perhaps not defence spending, but at the very least on defence rhetoric. Friedrich Mers has styled himself as a big

supporter of Ukraine. He recently called for an ultimatum to be issued to Vladimir Putin, where Germany would give Putin 24 hours to stop launching attacks on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. And if they didn't stop, Germany would immediately send tourist missiles. That gives you a sense of the flavor of Friedrich Mers' position on

on defence. But the question about defence-bunding in Germany always comes back to this really contentious central issue, which is something called the Schuldbrenzer, or the debt break, which is basically strict limits on borrowing in Germany. And there's been this debate running for many years about whether the Schuldbrenzer is a prudent fiscal policy that prevents Germany from getting into appalling amounts of debt.

Germany famously a very debt-averse country because of its sort of pre-World War II history. But at the same time, there are other voices in Germany, particularly on the liberal economic end of the spectrum, who say that they need to get rid of the debt break, that is actually constraining German growth in a really severe way. And there are others who would argue that the debt break in Germany is not just a German economic issue, it's a European economic issue.

you know, they make the argument that if you were to get rid of the debt break, it would have a knock-on positive effect on other European countries based on that theory, you know, that are rising tie-braisers or boats and it would help encourage and promote growth elsewhere. And this is going to be such a big part of the German election campaign, I think what to do with the debt break. I will say that Friedrich Mers, the CDU leader, has kind of hinted that a change in position on the debt break might be in the offing and that's definitely something to watch.

as the campaign continues. But as you say, Venetia, undoubtedly defence-bending in Germany, it's such a contentious aspect of German government policy at the moment, and it's probably going to still be very contentious, regardless of who becomes the next Chancellor.

Now, while in Ukraine, Francis has been talking to several members of parliament on and off the record to gauge their feelings about the prospects of a ceasefire and the appetite for negotiations. As part of those conversations, he sat down with MP Alexander Moregco, a legal professor before the war, and now chair of the Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Polimentary Relations. The conversation is wide-ranging, but it begins with Alexander's reaction to the breaking news about the use of storm shadows on Russian soil.

Well, Alexander, it's a real pleasure to be talking to you again. Just to remind listeners, you and I spoke in a cafe that was blasting out 1990s tunes. About seven months ago, it was the anniversary, the two-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion, and you were telling me

about the conundrum you faced as a renowned international lawyer as to whether you would actually have to get a gun yourself and fight to defend Kyiv and that would give you a lot of issues because as a lawyer you're not meant to be doing that. But obviously we're in a very different state of play now and we'll come back to some of the subjects that we spoke about then around resilience and the direction of travel as it seemed then in the war. But first of all I'd just like to start we have heard that British storm shadow missiles have been deployed against Russia.

Of course, we've been waiting for a very long time for permissions to be given whether it be on Attackhams, whether it be on Storm Shadows. What's your reaction to that news? Well, as far as I know, it hasn't been confirmed officially yet that the Storm Shadow or any other kind of missile was used, actually, produced in the West. But I view this situation from the perspective of international law because

First of all, we should remember that when the victim of the aggression is provided with weaponry, all kinds of including missiles, for example, it's in line with international law. If the aggressor is provided with military aid, technical aid by other countries, it's against international law.

So when the Western countries, including the UK, the United States, when you give to us missiles, like attacks or storm shadow, you help to defend not only Ukraine, but also international law. That's why it's important. But as soon as we get this weaponry, it is up to us to decide how to use it. And there shouldn't be any restrictions whatsoever in principle, except for international humanitarian law, of course, you know.

But when we're talking about using this weaponry against legitimate military targets in the territory of the aggressive state, in the territory of Russia, we're allowed to do this. And there shouldn't be, in principle, any restrictions about that.

So if we start using American produced or the UK produced missiles in the territory of Russia, it's absolutely in line with international law. Any restrictions would be absurd. For example, Russia is provided missiles from Iran.

or it's given ammunition from North Korea. And neither, as far as I know, neither Iran, nor North Korea, they don't put any restrictions on how Russia should be using their weaponry. In this case, also, you know, to have such restrictions would be for Ukraine not to be able to respond in kind against their aggressor, it would be absurd.

I believe that we should be allowed from the point of your military necessity also. Well, you lay out that the legal arguments there very clearly. Why then do you think that the permissions have not been granted? What's your understanding of somebody, of course, served with distinction and still does on the Foreign Affairs Committee of Ukraine? You speak perhaps more than almost any other member of parliament to foreign dignitaries. Why has there been that delay? What do they tell you in private?

To me the reason is purely psychological because there is still a myth about escalation and some politicians are trying to be overly or too careful because they believe in this escalation but to me it's nothing but a bluff on the part of Putin. He's blackmailing, he's using bluff and he's trying to scare western politicians but in reality we already have escalation

And Putin is desperate because, you know, he had to reach to the aid from North Korea, for example. To me, it's a sign of, very clear sign of desperation on his part. For this reason, I think that it was a mistake not to give Ukraine from the very beginning everything what we needed. And to me, unfortunately, it had its price in terms of human lives, lives of our soldiers and civilians. We should have been given long ago

all these missiles. Because it's about our survival, about our defense, and let's face it, Russia remains super power in a way it has enough weaponry, manpower, and the only chance for us to survive is to use all weaponry we can.

You touched on resilience there, and one of the themes in our interview seven months ago, which I listened back to before speaking to you, was this question of resilience. And you said very strongly there, very firmly, that you believed that in a test between Ukrainian and Western resilience and Russian resilience that Russia would lose that contest. At this moment, of course, it is beginning to look like it may be the other way. Is that a fair analysis? And how do you respond to that?

Well, we still have this resilience and we continue to fight. Even though Russia is like a steamroller in the eastern part of Ukraine, they don't care about human lives. Putin is ready to sacrifice thousands and thousands of soldiers to gain some territory. But relatively speaking, their territorial gains are not that big, not that huge.

And sometimes we have to make a choice between losing some territories, which are not strategically important, on the one hand and on the other hand saving lives of our soldiers. And I am in favor of saving lives of our soldiers. But despite this difficult situation in the eastern part of Ukraine, we still have some important successes. I mean the Kursk operation.

It has turned the tables. It was a very creative move. It had a huge political significance because it has shown that Putin is not capable to defend its own territory. He cannot guarantee security for his own people and for his own territory. And we've been holding these parts of the Kursk region for long enough.

to prove his weakness. Another area where we have success is Black Sea. You know that Russian fleet, military fleet, the Russian Navy had to flee in this grace, I would say. And also I would mention that Russians with each meter, they get, it will be more and more difficult for them to get more ground.

Because it's difficult for them to occupy a big part of our territory. Because it's not enough to invade, to take under control. You need to have regime of occupation. And you need lots of soldiers for that. So it will be more and more difficult for them. So they will be more and more exhausted. It's an interesting point, because of course that's one of the reasons why in the war on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, and again we spoke a lot about the First World War, seven months ago, but this time it's relevant in the Second World War.

that the reason why in Operation Barbarossa the Germans got bogged down was exactly to that point that the more land you take, the much harder it is to control that territory. Also in the case of Russia the front becomes much wider. It's an interesting point that's not often made, but it's a big one.

Whilst you point to those successes, the reality is that Ukraine has lost more territory in the last few weeks than consecutively for months prior to that. There is clearly a dire situation at the front that's coming from soldiers and it feels like the momentum at the moment is less with the argument of we fight on and is more with the idea of we need to

find some way of conducting negotiations, conversations. What do you say to that idea that now is the moment that we need to start talking to the Russians? I think that we have a serious problem with the very idea of starting negotiations. First of all, if we are talking about negotiations, for example, about ceasefire, we need to have them from the position of strength.

Second, there is a political aspect to that. I would compare the situation in Ukraine with 1940 and the UK, and there was a famous debate or discussion between Lord Halifax and Vincent Churchill. Lord Halifax, after the failure at Dune Kirk, he was insisting on starting negotiations with Hitler, and Churchill was against. And the reason for that, Churchill understood that as soon as they start negotiations, it would be more difficult to boost morale.

and to continue a war. So the psychological, political, psychological aspect to this issue. But most importantly is that in order to have any kinds of negotiations, you should be sure about your counterpart, about the other side, that if you reach any kind of agreement, the other side will abide by it, will keep its work.

But Putin has proven many, many times that he is not reliable. He is absolutely not trustworthy. He is not credible. And for this reason, the logical question arises. Why should we start negotiations with someone with Putin who will definitely not abide by the rich agreements? So it makes no sense to me.

I understand that the situation is difficult and it's very dynamic, but at present time I don't see any serious reason to start negotiations with Putin, and besides he himself is not interested in negotiations. Peace, any kind of peace, even ceasefire would call into question his power in Russia. Because, well, frankly speaking, at least from my perspective, peace for him means political or maybe even physical death.

That's why he's not interested. He's interested in his ultimate goal is to destroy our statehood. This is his ultimate goal, and he will pursue it no matter what. He can use as a disguise, as an element of tactics or propaganda negotiations on ceasefire. But for Ukraine, it will be only delayed death, such negotiations and such ceasefire.

So what would you say then to your colleagues and to many Ukrainian citizens who say there's been too much bloodshed? We've lost too much. We need to talk to them. What would be your elevator pitch to them about what the consequences of us being Ukraine?

us talking to the enemy. We have no option. The truth is that our option is death, basically, or to continue to fight no matter what. It's a war of attrition, and we need to outlast Putin. And by the way, President himself, in his speech before the Parliament about resilience, he said directly that we need to outlast someone in the Kremlin.

So of course he meant put him. But we have no choice but to continue to resist. You spoke of Kursk as a great victory and I can understand the influence on morale and it changing the political dynamic. But there is also a perspective which would seem to be supported by the decision on attack on President Biden that Kursk was there and partly launched at least or at least became strategically later on within a few months as being a bargaining chip in negotiations.

And that is why now the missiles are being used to ensure that Ukraine is able to keep Kursk for those negotiations. So whilst I understand your arguments, is it not true that actually the government, the West wants talks and that that is the approach that is being adopted?

I don't really love that some countries, for example, Germany, they might want talks to start. And we see some signs of that. But for the United States and for the United Kingdom, as far as I can see it, these countries, they say that it's up to Ukraine to decide to have talks or not to have talks.

and it's very important. As for the Kursk operation and the bargaining chip, I'm not sure that this is the bargaining chip because for us it's a matter of security because we need to have better protection of the suma region.

which has been shelled ruthlessly by Russians. So it creates some kind of special, I wouldn't say demilitarized zone, but some kind of zone, a buffer zone, which helps to protect our territory from Russians' shellings. So just staying a little bit longer on military, but then I would like to move on to other subjects.

The imagining of the front line at the moment as things stand when you talk to people is that these incremental gains will continue for Russia for some time. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but you're saying that the more that the creep happens, the harder it becomes for Russia, the more men they lose. And at a certain point, something changes. It's an interesting thesis. It's an unusual thesis. If that happens,

At what point are we looking at in terms of time? I mean, are we talking two months, six months, a year? I wonder where the line is for you in Ukraine and you talked about vital territory versus non-vital territory. Where does the vital begin, Alexander? Well, it's more kind of a military issue. To me, first of all, what I can see that Putin and Russian troops, they are not capable to take big cities.

So it's kind of natural defense for us, big cities. They are not even in Turkey, which is very close, like 30 kilometers from Russian border, and Russians are not capable to take over this city. They can gradually destroy it, but they are not capable to take it.

So for me, it's a kind of maybe we win time due to that. We might lose some territory but we are winning time and in the war of attrition it's crucial. Time is more important because we need to outlast.

Russia. One of my American colleagues has put it, there are some cracks in Russian system. And we expect that next year, by the end of next year's situation, in Russian economy will be more difficult. You know, this work and change can stop abruptly, very quickly and unexpectedly. But our point, our goal is to survive, to survive, to continue to fight and to outlast our enemy.

Well, let's talk then to politics away a little bit more from the military. If indeed it's possible to separate the two. Trump has just won the presidency. It has changed everything. I think that's not an exaggeration to say. What was your reaction to that news? Did you welcome it, as some Ukrainians did, or did it leave you with considerable alarm?

It was, I expected this to happen long ago. That's why we tried to reach out to, for example, Heritage Foundation or to some people in the entourage of Trump, you know, because it was expected. Heritage being a big think tank in the United States, yeah. And they are trying as far as they know to prepare a program for Trump. But I don't believe in unlimited freedom or will of the president.

Because there are lots of restraints, like, for example, political system, institutions, you have opposition, democratic parties, for example. And most importantly, you have national interests of the United States. And no matter who becomes the president, in this case, Trump cannot go against the national interests of the United States, geopolitical and economic.

And from the perspective of national interests, the United States should be interested in supporting and continuing to support Ukraine. Because if they lose Ukraine, it will be huge blow to their credibility in the world, to their position in geopolitical system.

Additionally, it will be very costly for them. From the economic, strictly economic point of view, it's much better and less costly to provide all necessary aid, material aid, military aid to Ukraine right now.

then to deal with emboldened, bigger Russian Empire in the future, which will threaten the Eastern flank of NATO and other countries. And it will be much, much more costly for the United States. Everything you've just said may well be true, but it doesn't seem at this stage that many of the people around Trump see it that way. When will they and how will they come to that realization, do you think?

Well, there are different people around Trump. Some of them understand what it's all about, and they understand why it's so important to continue to celebrate them. Are you in touch with them? Not yet, but for example, I am a member of Inter-Polementary Alliance in China. I am one of the co-chairs, and one of the co-chairs is Mark Rubio.

So for us, it gives an opportunity to reach out to him. And interestingly, his future position as the state secretary gives hope to us, because previously he is known as a staunch supporter of Ukraine. Another example, waltz who will become a national security adviser.

Previously, he also is known for support in Ukraine. So these two examples, these are two key foreign policy positions in the Trump administration. But the people who will hold these positions, it gives us hope that they understand what's going on. And I hope that they will try to persuade Trump to continue to support Ukraine.

It's a big if, but let's say that Trump does about turn and suddenly support for Ukraine increases.

How physically do you see that taking place? I'm interested in whether you see it in terms of weapons, whether you see it in terms of political red lines being laid down, troops on the ground. I'm just fascinated on this perspective of what the actual, we talk quite often in vagities, and I'm interested in whether you think there is a specific way in which this could work.

Well, first of all, mostly we're talking about providing Ukraine with all necessary weaponry. But to me, it's not even number one. Number one issue is American leadership. Because other countries, like Germany, other European countries, they're following the lead of the United States. This is what we need, first of all, from the United States. Very strong American leadership.

If we have it, if we have a very clear cut goal to defeat Russia and to help Ukraine to win the war, then I'm sure that the tools, the resources will be found. So I would say that your position is unusual, Alexander, on the issues that we've talked about today, because many people that I've alluded to, I've spoken to say the same thing, which is that Ukraine

doesn't want to keep fighting on, that it is exhausted, resources, manpower. And I wonder why then it is that so much has changed, if it from where we were perhaps seven months ago, when your view hasn't changed, but the country has changed. Why is it that Zelensky and other figures don't speak like you do? Is that for them trying to play

the United States in a way, and then actually beneath the surface, they still think the way that you've just articulated. Well, I believe that the president, he sees bigger picture than I do. And I express my point of view and my personal understanding. But the thing is that, you know, as I said, we have no choice but to continue to fight because when you are faced with imminent death,

you cannot afford to be pessimist, you cannot afford to lay down arms because it means imminent death for you. Even if you have limited resources, you still have to fight. And this is my kind of understanding and philosophy. Well, you spoke about the United States, spoke about Europe. Let's look at where you've just come from, which is Latin America. Tell me about why you were there,

and about the position as you see it at the moment of the so-called global self. The reason for my trip to these three countries, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru was to establish or to continue diplomatic parliamentary contacts.

Because these countries, first of all, they can be helpful diplomatically for us and politically. I understand that it's difficult to expect from them that they will provide weaponry. But they can vote in support of Ukraine, and some of them are voting in support of Ukraine as a general assembly of the United Nations.

Additionally, we can see in these countries they are difficult for us because we see that there is Russian influence and Chinese influence in these countries. And I have noticed that China and Russia are acting in unison. They are coordinating their efforts in these countries in this region, which is dangerous in itself because Russia and China are strategic partners without limits. And they are acting to the detriment of Ukraine.

But if we are not present in this region, in these countries, the vacuum is immediately filled by Russia and China. And for us, even our presence, even our contacts with our counterparts, with members of parliament in these countries, is already a victory. It's already important. It already changes their attitudes in favor of Ukraine. That's why it's so important. Are you warmly received?

Yes, yes, we are a delegation which consisted of three members of parliament. We were very warmly received, but not only by the members of parliament, but also, for example, we visited university, one of the universities is Colombia. And it was very warm and very friendly visit. And I realized that people in this region, they understand what's going on. They support Ukraine because they support rule of law and international law. They support justice.

We have lots of friends and we need to come to talk to our friends and try to persuade other colleagues to bring them on our side.

Many of those countries, though, have their own concerns, and we've seen and you alluded to the UN there, them articulate those concerns by, if not backing Russia, not condemning Russia at the United Nations. I wonder, what was your reaction to what's happened in the last seven months at the UN? What did you think as a renowned expert on international law to see Antonio Gutiérrez attend the break summit?

To me it was a huge mistake and honestly it was a shame because I would understand him if he initially would go to Ukraine and after that to Russia. But he refused to come to visit what was hugely important for us the first global peace summit. He didn't come in person.

Instead, later he came to Russia. Well, it makes no sense because the Secretary-General, when he goes to the country, which is the aggressor, which is committing genocide against the other member state, it's absolutely ludicrous to me and I don't understand this. I think it was a huge mistake on his part and I'm in favor of removing him from his position.

Do you think that international law and organisations like the UN have further been corroded over the last seven months since we last spoke?

I think so, unfortunately, because the major goal, the reason why the United Nations was created in 1945 was, I quote, the UN Charter to maintain a global peace and security and also to fight against aggressions. So the UN has failed and it more and more reminds me the League of Nations.

It has become helpless, unfortunately. So we should start thinking about a new, more effective international organization which would better perform its function to counter aggressions and to maintain global peace.

We're coming to the end of our time together. Are you expecting to run again for office in 2025? Is martial law going to end and you're going to see elections in Ukraine? I wish the next year would become a peaceful year for Ukraine. But I'm not sure. I think we should be prepared for a long battle, unfortunately.

But when the time comes, I don't know, it will be a very different situation. After the war, after the end of the war, I'm sure that Ukrainian society will be different, Ukrainian politicians will be different. And I'm not sure that I'll take this decision to run again. Wait and see. But I don't rule out. I don't rule out. If I see that there will be need in my competence, in my experience, I will run.

I hear rumours that some of your colleagues, not in your party, but I mean colleagues in Parliament, that they are thinking about what it would mean to run in 2025, where there might be new parties that would formulate this private polling taking places, which president would be the candidate, as it were. I spoke to Francis Farrell at the Keep Independent and he said, I hope they know something I don't, because I can't see us.

in that situation in 25 and I have to say I do too. But I wonder more broadly if we zoom out of that question and look at the nature of democracy in Ukraine now. I think it is in itself interesting that we're actually talking about

chaotic, terrible, bloody war that has in many ways built more of a society than destroyed it? And there's no, as far as I can tell, contemplation of democracy being eroded by the chaos that is inevitably sown in war. Is that fair? Do you think that this

war has only strengthened democracy in Ukraine. Even if, let's say, presidents were to be removed from power, do you think that there is no chance that democracy can be undermined profoundly any longer as a consequence of the suffering Ukraine has endured?

To me, the impact of the war, when we're talking about Ukrainian democracy, it's like a double-edged sword. So I see certain pluses and minuses. In one sense, the war has strengthened our resilience and thereby our democracy. And despite war, we have stronger position.

which is very voicey and the ruling party listens to their position. At the same time, I understand that the challenge will be to preserve liberal democracy in Ukraine after the war.

because there will be new challenges. One of them might be populism. To me, populism by its nature is a natural threat to democracy. That's why we'll continue our struggle for liberal democracy, for constitutional democracy, for human rights and rule of law, true rule of law. But it will be another chapter in our history. Do you think, just to end on this subject,

that let's say there were a peace deal signed that large quadrants of people were unhappy with. Do you think there would be enough people in the country where they'd be disaffected soldiers for a narrative of betrayal to form? Or do you think that actually whatever is finally agreed by the society, by the democratic parliament, would be accepted? And that, as you say, populism may resurface.

but it wouldn't be existential. Well, we're democratic society and I think it's even good when someone disagrees with the decisions taken by authorities, by the president, by the parliament. So it's natural. But again, if there are conflicts like that, the only solution, right solution is to use democracy as a method of solving disputes.

majority. It's about majority, but at the same time democracy is about respecting rights of minority. So that's why to me it will be another challenge for a democratic rule in the country, but I'm sure that we'll get over it. Alexander, we've covered a lot of topics there. Is there anything that we haven't spoken about that you think is important for listeners to be aware of or to put it on their radar?

Well, to me, always important to express the deepest and the most sincere gratitude to the people of the United Kingdom. I have never been to the UK. I've been many times and lived in the United States. But each time I talk to, for example, delegations of members of Parliament from the UK, I see that the UK is a true leader when we're talking about Europe. And we rely on your support, your help. And we hope that you will help us also to persuade Trump

the new American president to continue to support Ukraine. Alexander, always a pleasure. Let's hope it's not another seven months the next time that we speak to each other. Thank you. James, any final thoughts you want to share with us?

Yes, I think that one of the points I'd make is about civil defence. When we think about war and when we talk about war on this podcast and elsewhere, inevitably, there's a big focus on the front line. There's a big focus on drones, on the infantry, on infantry fighting vehicles, on tanks and so on. My takeaway from Berlin security conference was that

There is a sense among NATO leaders that the public, that normal people, that civilians also play a really important role in the decisive outcome of war. One, I believe German General said during this conference in one panel, wars are

fought by military means, but they are won by economic means, referring to the ability of all the civilian infrastructure, all the business infrastructure, the political infrastructure, behind the soldiers who are funneling money and funding into equipment. We know, for example, in the Russia-Ukraine War that a big part of this sort of war of attrition is this kind of relentless investment in the Russian military by Vladimir Putin.

risk of turning the tide, and the role that the public plays in that, according to lots of senior NATO voices at this conference, is very, very important. It's not just about being resilient, it's also about, as I said earlier, civilian infrastructure supporting the work of the military in a war scenario. And so as the temperature rises,

and concerns about the potential outbreak of war get larger, which they may do or they may not, depending probably in large part on the trajectory of the Trump administration. But even so, this is going to be a big part of the debate.

Thanks, Jones. I think for me listening to you speaking, it's been really great to have you on with us today. It's clear that Germany will be such an important part of the puzzle next year. We've focused a lot on Trump's new cabinet, the American elections, and the fallout of that for Ukraine. And of course, that's right, because they're the biggest military backer.

But in terms of political support and I guess also getting Russia to hit its side of the deal, I think Germany will play a very key role next year and how Europe is able to sort of back Ukraine and put its weight behind Kyiv to support whatever peace deal may or may not emerge following Trump coming into power. That would be really interesting to see and the outcome of the general elections will obviously play a big part in that.

Ukraine the latest is an original podcast from The Telegraph, created by David Knowles.

Also an up to dispatches, our Foreign Affairs newsletter, bringing stories from our award-winning foreign correspondence straight to your inbox. We also have a Ukraine live blog on our website, where you can follow updates as they come in throughout the day, including insights from regular contributors to this podcast. We also do the same for other Breaking International stories.

You can listen to this conversation live at 1pm London time each weekday on X Spaces. Follow the telegraph on X, formerly known as Twitter, so that you don't miss it. To our listeners on YouTube, please note that due to issues beyond our control, there is sometimes a delay between broadcast and upload, so if you want to hear Ukraine the latest as soon as it's released, do refer to podcast apps.

If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Ukraine the latest on your preferred podcast app and leave us a review as it really helps others find the show. Please also share it with those who may not be aware that we exist. You can get in touch directly to ask questions or give comments by emailing UkrainePod at telegraph.co.uk and we do continue to read every message. You can also contact us directly on X. You can find our handles in the description for this episode.

As ever, we're especially interested to hear where you're listening from around the world. Ukraine the latest was produced today by Phil Atkins. Executive producers are Louisa Wells and David Knolls.