Ah, okay, good to know. So we should not ship tomorrow then. Don't do it tomorrow. Please wait until we get sick. Yeah. Good day. Glad we asked. I'm going to send you the press release. So you just, it has the embargo at the top.
Welcome to Season 8, Episode 4 of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert and I'm the co-founder and managing director of Seattle-based Pioneer Square Labs and our Venture Fund, PSL Ventures. And I'm David Rosenthal and I am an angel investor based in San Francisco.
and we are your hosts. In 2018, we did an episode on the early stage Seattle startup Rec Room. Founder and CEO Nick fight joined us at the time to talk about their seed round that they had raised from Sequoia. At that time, they were a popular app in the slow to develop VR landscape with a couple hundred thousand users and zero dollars in revenue.
Earlier today, Rec Room announced in the Wall Street Journal that they had raised $100 million at a $1.25 billion valuation from existing investors Sequoia and index ventures. They are now a product that spans across many platforms from, of course, virtual reality, but also to Xbox, PlayStation and iOS.
They have had astonishing growth numbers over the last year where they grew revenue 660% and now have over 15 million lifetime users, 2 million of which are creators on the platform.
And we knew them when. Indeed. The background of all of this is that 2020 was a heck of a year for the entire metaverse category. You have epic and Fortnite's growth. They're currently rumored to be raising at a $28 billion valuation.
Of course, Roblox's Blockbuster IPO that they pulled last December because there was too much demand and instead raised private capital and then did their direct listing this month and are now valued at $40 billion. The price was too high.
It was too high. You could say it's been a transformative year for rec room and the entire industry to say the least. So today we are back to tell part two of the rec room story. And again, with the best person in the world to join us, Nick fight. So Nick, welcome back to acquired. Thanks for having me back. I'm excited to dive back in. This is great. I think you are the first repeat guest on the main show.
Wow, all right, cool. Love it. Yeah, and over so many different stages of your company, I remember the premise of part one was how to raise your seed round with this guy we know who's raised it from Sequoia. And he's got this cool company, and who knows about this very speculative space. And here you are, like a mature grown-up company, back to tell all of us how to do it. And it was just a straight line from those two points. There was no hardship in between, yes.
As it always is, especially in consumer entertainment, I'm sure. Well, listeners, are you an acquired Slack member? If not, what have you been waiting for? It is a spectacular community discussing, of course, recent acquired episodes, but more importantly, it's just a genuine and smart group of people having a thoughtful, nuanced, and respectful discussion about the tech and investing news of the day.
Fun fact that I just learned is one listener recently hired three other smart members of the acquired community this month into his company directly from the Slack community. You can join at acquired.fm slash Slack.
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Ultimately, ServiceNow and AgenticAI is the way to deploy AI across every corner of your enterprise. They boost productivity for employees, enrich customer experiences, and make work better for everyone. Yeah, so learn how you can put AI agents to work for your people. By clicking the link in the show notes, we're going to servicenow.com slash AI dash agents.
And lastly, I will keep this brief today. If you are not a limited partner, you should become one. We had a delightful LP call with so many of you last week, and we're looking forward to more to come. You can join at acquired.fm slash LP, and we can't wait to see you there. David, Nick, let's dive in. Let's do it. I'm ready. Let's do it. OK, so as Ben said, last we left you, you guys, the plucky rec room crew. It was February 2018. You'd raised this great seed round from Sequoia.
You'd also raised an internal A from Sequoia that I think you didn't have announced by then. Everything seemed to be great, but I was actually wondering before we get into what's happened since we didn't talk as much about the.
Sort of real founding story of record back then. I was wondering if we could revisit it this time of how you guys actually came together out of Microsoft and started this company. I think it'll be really good context for entrepreneurs out there to understand. Maybe that there's not always a big grand plan to become a billion dollar company from the beginning.
Yeah, I mean, I think the founding stories you normally hear, it's a very cleaned up narrative of like, I had this vision or I was doing this mundane task and this light bulb like went off. And that was not true for us. So I was working on the HoloLens team at Microsoft.
And I'd been working on it for, I don't know, maybe like four or five years. And it was right before the first headset launched. My team was really focused on kind of consumer products for HoloLens. So like video games, essentially, like what kind of games are people going to play out of HoloLens? And then as the HoloLens team progressed, it really shifted far away from consumer towards less, let's shoot aliens in your living room to let's help bowing assemble jet engines. It really went enterprise and military.
And it left my team that I was working with as a, you know, kind of irrelevant and a bunch of us got reworked. So we had this team, we all loved working together and then the team got, where did you get reworked to? I got reworked to the Microsoft Edge browser. So.
And man, it was so difficult because I've been working on the future for four or five years and now I'm working on Microsoft's second browser that I don't quite understand. What's wrong? Why can't we fix the first one? Why is there another one?
So I found I was moving over there, and I was just so passionate about the AR and VR space. I wanted to stay in that space. And so as soon as I found out there was going to be a reorg, I actually applied to every company that was doing stuff. I applied to Oculus. I applied to Magic Leap. I applied to Google. I think I applied to Epic, because I knew their engine was focused on it. And I got turned down everywhere. So no one wanted to hire me.
And I was like, man, I feel like I have this valuable skill, like shouldn't somebody want to hire me? Not even magically. Magic Leap, not a fan. Yeah. And I think there were a couple other people that felt like I did. So shortly after this reorg, I don't know, maybe like 30 to 50 people left Microsoft and we're just like, you know, I don't know what's next, but it's not going to be groove music or it's not going to be the calendar app, you know,
And to set some context, Microsoft had been experimenting with what would become the HoloLens for seven, eight years. It predated the work done on Oculus, right? Yeah, I think my first demo of HoloLens was in 2011, maybe.
Yeah, super early. So very, very early. And I had been working on it for years. But I think when Microsoft first started it, they saw it as a successor to Connect. And then over time, it was like, well, Enterprise makes a lot more sense, given the use cases were able to light up right now in the expense. So in Microsoft's defense, everything they did made a lot of sense. This was not ready to be a consumer product. It was way too expensive. And the use cases that we could light up at the time just didn't make sense. And so having a bunch of game devs focused on this didn't make any sense.
So a bunch of the game devs left, you know, a couple of them formed various companies that kind of focused on VR and against gravity happened to be one of them. So me and five other people came together to form a company called against gravity and to just give you an idea of like how little of a plan there was.
The reason the company wasn't called Rec Room was we didn't have the idea of Rec Room. We had no idea. We actually thought maybe we could leave and maybe Microsoft would let us keep developing stuff for HoloLens. We couldn't get a dev kit. So not only did you not have the idea for Rec Room, you had no idea. The plan was just we're working together, we're going to get together, we're going to do something.
Yeah, so as I said, I think like 30 or more people left and a bunch of them were like, I'm going to form this company, we're going to form that company. And then against gravity just happened to be one of those offshoots. The name against gravity actually is a demonstration of how little of a plan we had. The HoloLens headset internally was codenamed gravity.
It was so heavy. Like, you know, they were called like gravity A units, gravity B units. And so we were just like, well, we don't know what we're doing. We know we're moving away from that. And I guess we'll call it against gravity. But we were like actually still very excited to go build HoloLens software. We just couldn't get ahold of a HoloLens. Some friends at Valve hooked us up with an HTC Vive and we were like, okay, well, hey, we got a piece of hardware. Why don't we start messing around on this thing? Wow. That's so cool.
I think honestly, all of us thought like, oh, Microsoft will eventually get back in the consumer AR space and we'll just go back there. But in the interim, we'll do this. So yeah, I would say there was like not a ton of intentionality there. It was more like maybe some egos or brews. And I was just like, well, I guess we'll take a chance and try something different.
So I got to ask, you know, we're going to tell the whole story about, um, be there everything since your seed round and how you've gotten here, but to ask sort of an analysis question up front, do you think that figuring things out as you went in those early days?
Has that served you well in getting to hear in obviously most other VR companies that were started around then are certainly not doing what you guys are doing or as well as you guys are doing? Or would you say it's like, no, that was just how we started, but things have changed. I think it certainly gave the culture of the company a specific flavor. I wouldn't claim that it's like the right choice, but it was our choice. And I think it's led the rest of Rec Room to have a very
improvised style. We don't get too attached to ideas because there wasn't ever one early on that I think we were really, really attached to. I think we had seen some challenges at HoloLens about like
You know, we kind of all envisioned this, like, metaverse world where, you know, maybe different people are authoring rooms and objects and they all work together. Like, we did see that problem. Like, at HoloLens, there was an app that some people were working on that was like a travel app. Like, you could go to like Machu Picchu or the Colosseum. There's another one that was like- There's like, we're doing that.
Yeah, there was like another one that was like, I think it was called hollow Skype. And so you could like chat with somebody who was like maybe hundreds of miles away. And it was really cool. And there was a final one, which I don't think many people saw, but it was like a pet. And it was like this like little virtual dog and you could teach it tricks and stuff like that. But none of this worked together. Like we couldn't be chatting on Skype and then like go to the Coliseum and then be like,
Let's let our pets run around the Colosseum. It was one at a time. So you saw your pet, or you saw your the Colosseum, or you saw this person. And so that kind of highlighted for us. There's something about the app model that doesn't work in this space. And so I think that got the gears turning a little bit of like, maybe we could build a Wii Sports version of it that would kind of express our idea. But I would say that was definitely no
grand world conquering plan. It was like, how do we survive for a little while? Nick, just to put a fine point on what you're articulating here, when you were saying that maybe the app style doesn't work as well in this metaverse type world, can you help us understand what rec room is for folks who didn't catch you the last time around and maybe especially articulate this notion of it is just one big world? How did you come to that and what does it mean?
I mean very gradually and i wouldn't say i came to it you know i would say that there are many many people on the team that contributed a lot of you know there were a lot of tiny choices that kind of help help build where it is. But yeah so rec room backing all the way up rec room it's a virtual universe it's made up of millions of different rooms and all these rooms are unique experiences so.
There are battle royale islands, there are escape rooms, there are fashion shows, you could have a family reunion in Rec Room, you could have a book club, you could have a live performance of Hamilton, like all of these things have been done. So Rec Room is just like a very flexible environment where you can come together in a 3D world and users get to build these rooms and they can build and publish them.
and the way that they build is very unique. Rather than building in a game engine, you're just building the way that you would in Minecraft. You're in the game manipulating objects, and you can do it socially, so you can have up to 40 people in a room that are like...
chatting with each other and talking about the room that they're creating. Maybe you want to build a Castle Crashers game. I could be like, then why don't you go build the mo and David, go build the Castle, and I'm going to work on the scoring and put a little goblin army over here. We can just have that creation experience together. It makes creation very accessible to people, even if they don't know how to code, even if they don't know how to 3D model.
Yeah, there's unlike say Roblox, which we'll talk about more as we go. There's no separate creator app. It's all, it's all one world. Yeah, Roblox has another app called Roblox Studio, which is where you go and build and it kind of looks like Unity or Unreal. And it's a really powerful tool set. It does presuppose some knowledge about like, hey, you understand scripting and like what prefabs are and you might need to
manage some like network authority or something. Recroom, you're just kind of like building Minecraft style. And then when you press publish, we're like, great, we put your, your room is now accessible on phones and PCs and Xboxes and play stations and VR headsets. We'll just like host it for you and you don't submit to like a cert body or anything like that. So it's just this.
It's like the Wikipedia of games. There's just a lot of people contributing to this world, and new rooms are constantly popping to the top of a new hot list that people are discovering. You can follow creators to see what content they've created and get notified when they build new stuff. And then we've started letting users monetize in their rooms. So we have an in-game currency that users can charge currency inside their rooms. And if they am mass enough of the currency,
we'll actually pay them out for the currency. And so we've got like 14, 15 year old kids in there who are earning six, seven grand a month in Rec Room and we're trying to scale that up. We think that can be a lot bigger. But I think it just gives you an idea of the accessibility of the creation tools. It's really anyone can go in and realize the idea that's in their head and they can really easily distribute it.
Well, it shows up in the numbers. I mean, classically, the internet was 100% of people consumed, and then 10% of people commented, and then 1% of people created. And those numbers haven't held exactly true for a long time as we've entered this social era, but that was sort of the old moniker. But you look at...
2 million of the 15 million users that you have are creators on the platforms to dramatically higher percentage since they're able to author it right there in that environment. I'm cheating a little bit because you and I went in and played and you showed me the Maker Pen and I got to build my own little world. But it's remarkably easy to use tools like that to create.
It's certainly a lot more accessible. And I think if you're the generation that grew up living on the internet, living in games, it's a very familiar medium for you to create. Yup. Yup.
Well, so let's dive into the history here a little bit. So you told me a moment ago that you publish across Xbox and iOS and VR headsets. Last time we chatted, you were just a VR company. So the VR boom didn't really arrive in the way that we were all sort of speculating and hoping, you know, how did that affect you as a company? And how did the calculus of, hey, maybe we should have a contingency plan come about?
Yeah, so I mean, to give a recap, I think of the previous episode, like we raised a seed round in 2016. We had launched the app and it was doing pretty well for like a VR app. And so we were able to launch a seed round around that. And then a couple months later, after working with our investors, we had a good track record of
Evolving the product and finding growth. And so we were able to raise an A round from Sequoia as well. So it was just the same investor that did the A. That happened about nine months later. And we were just kind of keeping that secret as we kind of planned out what was next. When we chatted, you know, we had just rounded out holiday 2017. We had seen a lot of growth, like probably from October to December 2017, that the app like 5xed. So like,
We were doing really well. It was kind of a weird situation. We had had all of this growth, but then we were looking out over 2018 and we were like, man, there are no headsets on the horizon. Are there any headsets in 2019? It was like, man, normally where people are shipping us dev headsets 12 months ahead of time and they're like, hey, we're going to do this in the holidays and get ready. We just had nothing.
We were like, you know, like this growth is good, but this is not a venture scale business. And your growth was basically capped by the number of VR headsets, right? Because you were a free app. So everyone would go or a lot, you know, the majority of people who had a headset would go download you. So you were basically like, your growth was governed by the headset growth. Oh, 100%. So to give you an idea from like December 2017, for the next 24 months, VR did not grow, like at all.
So your market, no growth, zero perspective. Totally. I think we were fortunate by, like we sobered up and realized it like January. So credit to the team, I think it would have been really easy to be like, oh, we just five X, like we're world beaters, like we're amazing, keep doing what, but I think it was, oh, we just five X and that's it. Like this is not, there's nothing on the horizon for us. Like this is,
So we need to figure out some path for more growth. And to that point, we had been building all the content ourselves. So Rec Room was a universe of rooms, but they were rooms that we were building and they were only like maybe 10 or 15 of them. And we were good at building rooms.
We really enjoyed it. It was really fun. We were building these little quests where we're like, you're going to go battle space aliens with laser blasters or you're going to take to the high seas and battle armies of skeletons. It was really fun. We were building these little contained rooms and we were like, okay, well, this is just not going to work anymore. We have to do something very dramatically different. The two ideas that I think we seized on were
the community was so creative. The community was a really bending and breaking rec room to do other things. We'd hear stories where people were like, oh, yeah, we went to, I just invited a bunch of my friends to go play disc golf. You have a disc golf room. We just turned off the rule sets and we have a little picnic in the park and we're like, oh, okay. Somebody else was having murder mystery parties in one of the rooms. They would just turn off the tool set and
Last we chatted, two people had actually gotten married. Yeah, totally. But there wasn't really the system as high as creative community. People were hacking the game to get it to do things that we hadn't intended.
We're like, OK, well, what if we lean into this? What if we would have, instead of our rooms, it's their rooms? And what would it mean to to kind of embrace this creativity? Like people are going through all these hoops to build these like amazing murder mystery parties, but they can't save anything. And if you're not in the room with like the host, like it doesn't work. So what would it look like if you know, they could set up a room and they could publish it and other people go there and have that same experience, even without the host? So that was sort of like one of the big problems we started playing with.
Then the second was, we're like, all right, we've got to find growth outside of VR. There was an app called VRChat that had really started scaling around the same time outside of VR. It had really found this pretty devoted audience on PC. We were like, okay, well, hey, it has worked for someone. Someone was able to find
a marriage between VR and a flat app that works. And that gives us confidence that we might be able to do it as well. So we really started to lean into user-generated content and screens. That was kind of what we went. At least you went to iOS next, right? That was your first flat world experience. Our first flat world experience was actually on PlayStation. So PlayStation and PC.
Because you had gotten a bunch of uptake from the PSVR. That was probably your big growth holiday 2017. Yeah. PSVR was the big 2017 growths. And then we were like, okay, well, we're already on PSVR. What would it mean to make it work on PSVR without the headset? And kind of like the same question for PC. So that summer, we like did this big unveiling. And we were like,
All right, now you can have players from outside of VR. Now we're mixing in your rooms with our rooms. And it was like dark days. The community was not happy about it. It was a big departure from what we were doing. And I think there was a lot of, hey, we want this to just be what it was. We don't want this to evolve in the way that you're doing this. And what was it downside to them of having someone nod in a headset coming in?
Well, I mean, I think a lot of the users who care deeply about headsets, you know, that kind of is its own community itself. And so, you know, there probably was this like bonding element of people coming in on headsets. Like, you care about VR, I care about VR. Like, this is great. We both care about VR.
And like, that is a magical thing that we want to preserve. Like we want to have VR rooms where these people that care about things can find people. I think the big mistake we made out of the gate was we were like, we're just like one big community. We're just going to like dump everybody into the same rooms together regardless of interest or intent. And that was challenging. Like that was probably not the right move. The other challenge was like our user generated content tools were really
you know, they were in their infancy. And so the rooms that people were building were like, not very high quality. Our belief was like, look, if we can shine enough light on them and they're the right incentives, like maybe eventually we can get them. But the moment that we made the shift, like it was probably pretty abrupt. So I think the thing that we learned, like I think for, you know,
two years, we were like, all right, we're going to be really iterative, we're going to experiment in public, we're going to ship stuff, and we're not going to be embarrassed by it. We want feedback from the community. And I think we probably realized there's probably some metabolism that the community can evolve at this speed, and we probably pushed it too hard then.
See, you guys are right after we did our last episode. You guys are pretty deep in the trough of sorrow at this point, right? Oh, yeah. I mean, like from 2017 to like all the way through 2019, it was like, no one wanted to do any VR stuff, but the VR users were like very passionate. And so it was hard to explain to that group. It was like,
Yeah, we know you just want us to focus just on you. But if we want to keep serving you 10 years from now, because we need to keep scaling this business. And I think some people really understood that they were like, OK, hey, in order to make sure that we weren't charging any money so that there was no revenue coming in. So we were like, OK.
I think if you're a startup, you have two lifebloods, either revenue or growth, and we didn't have any revenue, and we weren't going to find any growth in VR. So it was like, okay, well, we're either going to make this a $30 paid app, which I don't think that serves anybody well, or we need to go find growth outside of VR.
trying to get profitable? Were you like, okay, if we were to turn on monetization, how long would it take to find something that worked? How much could we actually cover our burn and get to like a zero net burn? Would our investors be on board with that? What does the calculus look like when you're sort of examining that as a potential?
I mean, it's an unreasonable question. I think once we looked, the really bright spot for us was the user-generated content. We were like, this is going to take a long time to make it click. But eventually, if we can take these VR creators, if we can scale their creations, if we can get them monetizing a user base that's at a mobile scale,
they will be happy, we will be happy, this will be like a really strong business with great network effects, very scalable. And if we just pivot hard towards like, we are going to try and extract the maximum number of dollars from the very limited number of users we have, so that we're cash flow neutral, like we're just not heading along that path. So I think we were just more comfortable being like, okay, hey, we think that the promised land is really this user generated content ecosystem where
where we're rewarding our best creators, you know, for the amazing work that they're doing that just looked different. So I don't know that we ever really looked at it.
Were there example companies or products you guys were looking to as sort of like either inspiration or like a vision of what the promised land could look like? Like, I'm wondering, like, were you looking at something like an Instagram war pin? Like, yeah, like if you can get this UGC flywheel going or maybe even Roblox at that point in time, which it was starting to spend even though most of the rest of the world didn't know it yet.
Yeah, I mean, I think we were definitely aware of Roblox. We were looking at probably a lot of stuff like YouTube and Twitch. We were like, okay, look, they have this creator class. They're able to reward the best of them. It creates really great incentives throughout the ecosystem where, like,
The platform's not pestering you for money all the time. You're really only rewarding the creators that you care about if you're a consumer. And then the creators are really acting as wonderful evangelists for your app. You shouldn't need to spend a whole bunch of money on marketing because the creators, well, you can have creator-led growth, basically. So we were looking, I think Twitch was a really interesting one for us to look at there. Yeah.
This may, when it actually happened, might come a little later with when you introduced rec tokens and the economy. But one thing I know you guys did that I think was really interesting was incentivizing. You had this problem where you had this very passionate user base. You wanted new behaviors out of them. You thought they were capable of doing these new behaviors and doing them well, but you had to incentivize them to do it.
And so I think if I'm getting it right, when you launched Rec Tokens, you got Rec Tokens for accomplishing specific actions that you guys set up in the environment, right? Yeah, the economy has evolved. So David's referencing a thing called Rec Tokens, which is basically the in-game currency that we use. And you can use the in-game currency to buy things to like kit out your avatar. So you can buy shirts and hats and gloves. And you can also buy virtual food. We sell a lot of virtual food.
Root beer and pizzas and donuts and stuff like that. And then- And people are buying those both from you and from each other, right? Yeah, and then creators can charge for things inside their room so you could build a nightclub with a VIP lounge and it costs some tokens to go in there or a fashion show and different outfits costs different amounts of money or maybe you're in some haunted mansion and creators are selling flashlights and lightbulbs.
Light bulbs in the desert. Yeah, totally. So people are doing all kinds of really interesting stuff with it. It's a pretty flexible system. But if you look at where it is today, it went through a number of different stages of evolution to get to that point. For a while, we just had avatar items and you just did something good in the app. We're like, you have an opera.
You made a friend or some action we cared about, here's an item. We then started, we're like, okay, we're not gonna give you items anymore. We're gonna give you currency instead. And then there's a store with the items. And so you started getting used to like, okay, well, I've got the currency. And like, what do I wanna buy? And currency equals this much item. And then we unlocked an ability to buy the currency. And then we turned off the ability to earn the currency.
except the ability for you to earn the currency then shifted to, okay, well, you know, you maybe not, you can't earn it through leveling up necessarily, but you can earn it through creation. So you can create something and you can't earn it from us, but you can earn it through other people finding value in what you do. And that's not entirely true. Like there is still, we do print a good amount of currency every day to like stimulate demand, right? You know, so the little rec room fed in the corner. Yeah, exactly. We're like, yeah.
quantitative easing in recroom. We do print an amount of currency as well because we do see behaviors we want to reward. We're just probably a little bit more careful about the way that it works so that it's not an easy-to-game system. You can't create a thousand smurf accounts and like hoard the currency and then move it around.
And so for people familiar with games, it sounds like what you had is you had only items, and then you introduced a soft currency, and then you took that soft currency, made it a soft and hard currency, and then made it basically exclusively a hard currency. And soft currency is currency you earn, hard currency is currency that you buy.
Yeah, so if you looked at a gaming textbook of how to build an economy, Recroom did all the wrong things. You should never be crossing the streams of your heart and your soft currency. You should never shift one to the other. I think we just had this idea of, okay, this is where we want to get to. Creators are making money. That's the end goal here. And what are the...
If that's Charizard, we're at Charmander. How do we evolve into that thing? Can I ask that this is a derivation, but a team question, once you realize you're going to do this, and as you're doing it, are you like, ooh, we should have an economist at our company. Is it a PM? Who owns this? Clearly not, since he broke all the rules.
No, we've had, we really have like focused pretty hard on having generalists tackle as many of our problems as possible. So the team behind this, it was like, there's an amazing designer that had worked in mobile gaming for a while. There was an amazing dev lead that worked with me at HoloLens and, you know,
Him and her worked on this this problem over probably two years like okay How like we have this currency we have this economy that doesn't match at all the goal that we want like how do we keep evolving it without and I think it was largely informed by our Choice early on so like okay. Here's screen players. Here's user-generated content and that that did not work like it was too much too fast and so for this one they were kind of like okay, what are the
stages we need to go through, where the community will understand the incentives, they will be excited for each of the changes that we make. They were just really thoughtful about it and they carried it out very intentionally over the course of probably about two years.
And then shifting to the creator side, what kind of behavior do you observe? Let's say I build a really successful haunted mansion, and I'm selling flashlights. When do people decide to keep the rec tokens that they've earned, and when do they decide, you know what? This is a job for me, and I'd like to make some cash on it. It's probably a scale question. The currency
It's kind of like, I guess if you went to a thrift store and you were like, I'm going to trade in some clothes. And they're like, well, you can have this much an in-store credit or this much in cash. Yeah. It kind of depends on what those numbers are. GameStop. GameStop, probably currently. GameStop, kind of the same deal. Yeah. And so if you go in and you're like,
Hey, we'll give you $60 or $300 in store credit at GameStop. You're probably like, well, I'm going to buy a couple more games. Give me that $300. If you add two zeros to the end of that and you're like, you can have $30,000 in store credit or six grand, you're like, well, six grand sounds better. Unless you want to be a real entrepreneur and start arbitraging.
Reselling, I mean, depends. Honestly, it's kind of like a capital allocation question, right? Like if you're a creator, you're like, well, how much do I want to pull out of this business versus keep reinvesting? Because they can distribute those tokens to their users by incentivizing behavior.
They can do, there's some element of that. They can basically place free gifts inside their rooms and they can pay for the gifts in advance and stuff like that to try and drive activity towards their rooms. So yeah, it really comes down to like, you know, what do you value and how much of this currency do you have?
One of the classic game economy problems is you will end up with users who have so much currency. They can kind of like ruin your economy. And so it's me like billionaires. Yes.
And it's the same estate tax sort of challenge. The problem that they run into is these people get tired of the game because it's no fun anymore. I can buy everything. So they'll just give their account to somebody else, and it'll ruin the game for that person then, too, because, well, it's just like,
The game genie has been turned on and now everything's free. And so really what we're trying to do is like, okay, well, hey, some of these users are going to have Scrooge McDuck sized piles of in-game currency. How do we pull that out of the system so that their incentives stay aligned with ours and they're not just like dropping, you know, they're like a fun name for an estate tax. No, we do not have.
It is fascinating, though. I mean, very quickly, even with the most sort of simple mechanics, you quickly get to a place where I mean, even David, and I think this is the first time I've heard of rec tokens. David did a better job researching than I did. And my mind is racing on all the ways that I could, I could game this thing. And I'm sure you just have, you have to very carefully. Ben's going to quit acquiring it and your new side gig is going to be skimming record. I mean, I think these systems are, well, I think you're going to see more of them.
in games, they are fairly complicated to set up. There are a lot of things to be mindful of, both from like, okay, you don't want to be a bank, you don't want to create a security, you want to adhere to know your customer laws and stuff like that. So there is a lot of complexity behind the scenes. And then also there's a whole bunch of complexity for like, okay, and how do you ensure you're not getting scammed along the way here as well? So that's why we have a fairly large team focus on that problem. And to date, it's worked pretty well.
That's cool. So what is through these three major, major things you've figured out since our last episode of multi-platform UGC flywheel and creating this economy? What is the trajectory of the business and the company look like through this time? Obviously, you'd raised between the seed and the A, it was about $15 million from Sequoia, right, initially.
How are you, how are you living during those that trough of this trough of sorrow years, you know, where you didn't have revenue coming in fundraising more was probably going to be a challenge. Yeah, I mean, I think again, you know, going back to the roots of, of rec room and I don't think we were.
I don't think we had a normal founding story. I don't know that we had normal founding ambitions. And I don't think the people that we hired were like, quote unquote, start up people. I don't think they were folks from the valley that
spent two years at a place, got their options, and then bounced to the next hopefully Facebook. So I think the people that we had hired to date were like a love rackroom, a love VR. I see the problem, like I see the challenge that we're facing, and it's an interesting set of challenges. So I think
because we had sort of an unconventional founding, we had hired kind of unconventional backgrounds that were like, I'm willing to see this through the likely tough times. So we had no attrition during this point at all, which was really cool. Like nobody left. Everybody was like, all right, I understand the challenges and like,
This kind of is painful getting yelled at by the community during these transitions. But we really do think it's in their best interest. We really do think if we want this thing to still be around in five or 10 years, we have to go do this stuff. And so it's worth getting some yelled at on Reddit if it means a couple of years from now, we can start having these creators earning
a ton of money. That's a really interesting world to go and live in, and it's worth a little bit of temporary pain. When you say the temporary pain, if you think about the VR True Believers, obviously, I'm going to flash us too far forward today, but the Oculus Quest 2 is out. By all reports, that's doing very well. PSL Ventures, we have a portfolio company Big Box VR with a game called Population 1. They're seeing it. It's been phenomenally successful. I think you know, touch in the CEO well. It's a great game.
Yeah. They built a lot of good stuff. They built Smashbox. Their engine is awesome. They're great. Yeah. And so we could be at a little bit of an inflection point now where it's too soon to tell, but VR could be here in a major consumer way. And when you were thinking in the long-term best interest of these users who are VR die-hards, were you thinking like the long-term
for Recroom is we will be a VR thing. And this is sort of the way that we survive in the meantime, and sure, it'll be multi-platform kind of forever now that we've taken the genie out of the bottle. But we're always thinking like the end all be all will be VR. I'll put it this way like.
There were a bunch of companies in 2018 that had built VR things and then pivoted to, we're not going to try and do cross platform. We're just going to like, VR is done. We're moving to, that was never a conversation for us. We were just like, we really love VR.
Man, we really hope it's a thing. There's not a ton in our power to make it happen. We certainly think of a cheaper device with better marketing and West cables that works a little bit better would do well, but we don't know and we can't really affect that ourselves. But we never talked about like, oh, we're just gonna do a hard pivot out of VR. Even though almost everyone that I was chatting with in the VR space was just like,
We're hard pivoting to this new app. Enterprise SAS, yeah. Yeah, we're just totally doing a totally different thing. And we really wanted to see the VR journey through. We just knew, OK, if we exclusively focus on VR, either this is going to be like,
a six-person team for two years while we wait, or we can go try and find growth somewhere else through user-generated content and through other platforms. And we think we can actually ultimately build a much larger business that at the end of the rainbow, it'll have a much larger reward for VR users as well, because it'll mean if they create content instead of reaching just VR users, they can reach VR and Xbox and PlayStation.
iPhone. And all of those users are potentially monetizable to them. And so their reward can just be so much greater. And then I think we started seeing like, I think there were like a lot of VR hardcore users that were like, okay, well, like, I kind of didn't like this to begin with, but, you know, there is something nice about me just being able to hop into Rec Room like really easily and not move my coffee table out of my way.
I can just check and see if users are in there. I can just check on my room real fast and like, I can now do that without like, or like, honestly, because all the headsets were getting old, we had a lot of users that were like, my entire social life is in rec room and my controllers broke and I can't get HCC to fix them. But I can still hang out with my friends because like, I can still make it in here.
And so I think there were a lot of benefits that people started seeing from it. It definitely was not apparent when we first did it. I think there were a lot of people that were like, I don't know that this is the right move.
There's also another dynamic that I want to talk about. You explained to me a little bit ago that maybe you could talk about here, which is if you guys had said, you know what, we're going to fork this and there's going to be the VR version of Recroom and then we're also going to make the flat screen version of Recroom.
That would be fine, but the experience, what you can do, even in a flat screen environment, when your platform is architected for VR is so much more, and you explain it to me as sort of as the difference of like, in a video game and like Street Fighter or whatever, like you punch, you hit a button and you punch, in Requiem, you punch, you know, or you jump or whatever.
Yeah, I think, yeah, if you look at screen games, if you look at mobile games or you look at like keyboard mouse or controller, generally the behaviors that your avatar can do, they are finite. So they can jump or they can punch or they can pick up things or they can place things. But there is a finite number of them. There are n things that your player can do because there are an n combination of these buttons.
For Rackroom, because we started in VR, the player actions were always infinite. It was like, well, could somebody backflip? And it's like, well, we can't stop them. If you're wearing a headset and you do a backflip, that can happen, right? Can players lie down? Well, yeah, definitely. Can players like...
Juggle? Yeah, of course. And so with the UGC system, we started seeing all of these rooms that were built around behaviors we had never anticipated. It was like, OK, well, this is an escape room where you need to crawl under this thing. And while crawling, you need to pull out a lighter to light this candle on the candle. And so it was like, well, OK, if we're going to make this work on mobile, or if we're going to make this work on a keyboard and mouse,
like we can't have a crawl plus like whip out lighter button like that's not gonna work right because we don't know these things in advance we just need to build an avatar that's really really flexible and and like you as the you know controller of that marionette you need to be able to make this avatar do like damn near anything and so I think it just led to a very different control schema than you see in most games like the way that you can kind of control your rec room characters hands you have independent control over left and right hands and you can make them do a whole bunch of
Wild and weird things like dance or like wave or you know all sorts of wild stuff which is so different than like you know almost everything out there like Fortnite like Fortnite's great it's amazing but like you hit a button you jump you hit a button you shoot you hit a button you dance like that.
Well, yeah, I mean, what we're getting at here is there was a reasonably easy path that's like fork it, squash it down to 2D, and then use the same input system that works on iPhone games. And then there's a harder one that's like, can we keep it all one world and let you do, I assume not all, but a lot of the same flexibility from a screen that you can do in VR. And I have to imagine that now that you've crossed that chasm and taken door number two,
It pays off in all these ways of having a critical mass of people at all times in a single universe. Oh, totally. And I mean, there were many false starts along the way. I think our original idea was like, yeah, let's just jam all this into buttons. And then at some point it was like, oh my god, we've got like...
40 buttons and alt buttons and shift and control buttons. I was really adamant that the game on screens be third person for a while. That was an example of really bad design on my part because it made it really impossible for creators to
build a world that was cohesive. Because maybe they'd build an escape room in VR, and they're like, well, I've played it in VR, and it works in VR. And then you go in on screens, and it was like, OK, well, I need to pick up this post-it note and read this really tiny writing. And I can't do that because I'm in third person.
And so that was like a dumb move on my part, but you can see what happened. Like I remember you, you were showing me you're like, well, here's the, um, and this was in what 20 early 2018. It was like, here's the view. If you want to stream on Twitch, it goes to this like third person view so that, you know, it's not this like, I want to vomit because I'm seeing through someone else's headset. Uh, it's a, it's a third party sort of camera up behind me view. And you could imagine like, well, we should translate that. You can see why you would want that to be the case.
That was my design contribution that probably wasted like six months of dev time for somebody. So if they're listening now, I apologize to that. All right, listeners, our next sponsor is a new friend of the show, Huntress. Huntress is one of the fastest growing and most loved cybersecurity companies today. It's purpose built for small to mid sized businesses and provides enterprise grade security with the technology services and expertise needed to protect you.
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Nick, I have a question for you, because this is just like based on what we were just talking about. Was this a consideration when you were thinking about your currency? Like, wait a minute, can we get cash on the balance sheet? Like, can we have a nice cash flow dynamic here from asking users to buy rec tokens and then maybe we don't need to raise money as soon? Oh, from like basically like treating this as a float.
I mean, honestly, the way that it played out is kind of like when we first introduced the system, still the majority of the currency was coming through like our sort of item. So yeah, basically it was like, well, yeah, mostly what people are buying is government services. And so like that wasn't a huge consideration for us.
You can see as more and more of our economy shifts from a recroom specific, we're selling shirts to users selling shirts. You really do get a float on this. The benefit of these kind of ecosystems is it's not so much the float. I mean, the real value is like,
This is a much more scalable way of growing your revenue. It's hard to grow your revenue by being like, I am going to continually come up with new services and new items. And like every time I want to have a new hat or more hats, I need to hire more people over here. But if you build tools to let people do it, you just get a much more scalable catalog. And so in the beginning, it's a much harder way to grow revenue in the long term. It's a much better way of growing revenue. Hmm.
It's fascinating. Speaking of, by early 2019 to summer 2019, you're seeing some green shoots. You're starting to get through the trafasaro. What are green shoots, David? Green shoots. If I'm going here, I'm looking at our
our summer 2019 numbers. So by that point, screens had passed VR. So it was like the larger audience. We had launched on mobile. Mobile was our fastest growing audience. And VR was still doing well, which hasn't grown since 2017, at least in user base. We grew a lot on the engagement side, but the user base stayed around the same. So we were like, OK, we found growth outside of
VR, and we actually raised a series B in April 2019. And largely it was like, look, we took this VR, we sports, and we turned it into a cross-platform user-generated content platform, and we're about to launch on mobile. That was kind of the story for the series B. It was like,
And I was showing people the mobile build and praying it wouldn't crash while I was like, zowing it. Because we had basically taken a PlayStation app and we're going to run it on an iPhone, and that should work fine, I guess. Was that, did Madrona lead that round locally? That was index, actually. That was index. That was index, yeah. So that round was still kind of a story round, right?
Yeah, I mean, I think the thing that they were looking at was, well, it would be interesting to ask them what their thesis on it was. I think the interesting thing that they were seeing was this is an app that has been around for years and is still growing.
And it's taken some interesting turns. This user-generated gods and thing, it's clearly not what they were doing to begin with. This multi-platform thing, clearly not what they've been doing from the beginning. But both of them are working now. And maybe this team has more ways it can evolve. So I think it still was that story. At that point, our revenue was really de minimis.
Yeah, our revenue was barely existent. I think we had like one month of revenue. I think we made like 20 grand in a month. I think we were. Yeah. You had a 2021 revenue multiple on your fundraiser on that. Yeah, something like that. A 2021 era revenue multiple.
I think we were only monetizing on one platform. That might have been it. I think we were maybe only monetizing on Steam, but not on PlayStation and other stuff. So it started growing pretty quickly after that. But yeah, at the time, it was largely a
You know, I think we have interesting engagement numbers. We were like soaking up a lot of minutes, but in terms of like a business, it was, it was, you really had to squint to see it. So kudos to index for squinting pretty hard. So then, so I think I want to ask you about this. I think.
Once you turned on monetization across all the platforms and the economy started to work, it seems like pretty quickly after that, the business became a really good business. You were generating a significant amount of revenue at pretty high margins.
Yeah, I mean, I think you can, especially if you break out like, okay, what's fixed cost versus variable costs, right? Like the cost of supporting the service of Rec Room is relatively small. It's like, okay, well, we need these services, like we need Azure services and we need, you know, maybe this networking middleware and then we need moderation teams. So you're like, okay, what's that cost?
You're like, wow, all the scales really nicely. And so like most software businesses, it's really a, okay, and how much do you want to spend on RD to ensure that you're growing years down the line? So yeah, the business is growing really nicely. I think there's really, really interesting dynamics from the user-generated content side, just because
the revenue can grow really nicely without much input from us. And then if you look at the way, we have slightly lower margin on that revenue versus us selling out to creators. Totally. But it's really like,
We're happy to pay that out because those users are so valuable. They create so much value for us. They do such a good job of evangelizing the app and going and finding new users. I would rather spend money on that all day long than buy more ads on Instagram. Well, the two things I wanted to add.
highlight here that you just did is one, the beauty of this model is you don't really need to spend much of anything on user acquisition, right? Because you're, as you said, your creator led growth. It's your creators that are creating amazing things that are spreading the word about it that are bringing in users, right?
Yeah, I mean, we started doing some paid advertising like maybe two months ago. So we're like experimenting with it. I mean, I think there's probably some number greater than zero where it makes sense. But I think everyone who's been in the venture game knows that
Performance marketing is not you do not get economies of scale right in fact it goes the other way like the more you're spending The worst each incremental dollar gets but that's not true It's it's me playing pinball like I put a quarter in every time and eventually the ball goes to the bottom Yeah, except you're like you run out of like the good pinballs early Yeah, there's somehow there's worse and worse product market fit with every additional pinball that gets loaded in so
Totally, cause I mean, think about it. Like, let's say you're building a golf game on iOS that's like cartoony. So like the first couple of users you buy are like, I love cartoons and golf and I have a phone. And then like- That's exactly what I was looking for. From then you're like, okay, well, we've got all those users. Next step, we're like, you kinda like the PGA. And like, maybe we can get you into this like cartoon golf game, cause you like golf in some way. And then you get all those users and then,
Instagram is like, well, these users like being outside, I think, and maybe sports, and that's kind of related. Things that's fun, trust us. Yeah, so you're paying incrementally more and more to attract these users that want your thing less and less. And so I think there's definitely an amount that makes
sense to spend in performance marketing. But I think this is how a lot of people get in trouble is they're going to force performance marketing to work. And the only way you force it to work is you spend on those users that don't really want your thing. And so with the creators, I would much rather pay creators more money and help them figure out
Okay, here's more money. Now your incentives just went up. Go find the sub community that really vibes with the content that you've created. And they don't need to even love every part of Rec Room. They just need to love the thing that you built. So like we can have these kind of sub communities that are.
like I love very specific parts of YouTube. They're very different than I bet what you guys love, certainly what Jenny loves. That's great. Yeah. I think Twitch does this really well. I think there's a lot of different tones and styles and personalities on there. They'll go and find their people that make sense for them. That's what we want to happen in Rec Room as well. We want you to go
be able to build your little sub community. And if you're a user, we want to help you find your tribe. So like when you come in, we want to help direct you towards the content that we think is most likely to light up your interests.
It's very akin to the concept of marketplace liquidity. I remember a great realization that Dan Lewis opened me up to when we had him on for the convoy episode was he's like, look, we got the reason we need tons and tons of loads and tons and tons of truckers is because like there is one trucker load pair that is optimal. And then the further and further you get from that, like literally physical distance, the
worse of an economic deal it is for them because they're going to have to drive to come pick up the load. They may not want to. It might be the wrong day. If we can get everyone on the platform, then we can always find the perfect match. But when you're subscale, you're in this territory of most of the time it's probably sub-optimal and it's probably too expensive of a transaction.
And you can just sort of see that playing out in the world of games where I suppose the world of metaverses where the more people there are on the platform and the more sort of flexibility there is in the system, the more opportunity there is for people to find their tribe. That's why the internet is so great. There's incredible marketplace liquidity on the internet. Yeah. I mean, I think that's the battle that's about to be fought as like, what is the long tail of your metaverse, right?
So that the other aspect that we've already touched on is, you know, while it's probably not, maybe not something you guys think about it as actively, you do get a float out of this, like the users buy tokens up front and then they use Recroom and then they spend those tokens over time to creators who then over time either cash them out or don't.
You guys are generating float. It's the same deal with Roblox. It hasn't been covered enough about why people say Roblox is unprofitable. They're revenue numbers. It's like, no, no, no. It's accounting. Roblox is very, very profitable. Yeah. Very, very cash flow-generated. Yeah. So this all shifts. The business pretty like everything slow and then fast.
So last fall, you raised your series C, right? Yeah. So in November, we raised a series C. We raised 20 million from Madrona. And that's like eight months into the pandemic. That was eight months into the pandemic. And let you know, look, the pandemic had been
It had definitely driven activity for Rec Room. The moment lockdown happened, you can just see the jump. And Rec Room started getting used for a lot more unusual non-gaming things during the pandemic. That was where we saw...
teachers teaching classes in there, people holding group therapy sessions, people having family reunions. There were a lot more weddings happening in Recrim. So these were just a bunch of things that we were really excited about. Now, it just showed the flexibility of the platform. So we did that raise in November.
And then we launched on Xbox in December and then Quest 2, you know, back to the point about like VR, like, you know, platform shoes and oversized denim jackets. Like it goes in and out of style, man. And like it's coming back into style. And, you know, Quest 2, like Oculus, I have to give them props. Like they built an amazing headset and an amazing price. They did a great job marketing it. And we're seeing like amazing VR growth.
And I think that's poised to continue as more and more people start jumping into that AR and VR world. And it seems like that's likely to happen over the next couple of years. So we're really excited about that space. Do you see this 660% growth in 2020 more attributable to we have the best product market fit on VR? And there's this incredible VR device now that's sold well or is selling well? Or do you see it primarily attributable to it's the pandemic and people need a place to congregate. That's not the real world.
You know, I don't know that I could assign it to one variable. It was kind of like all these variables kind of clicked at once. Like we launched on Xbox and we were like the number one free app on Xbox for several weeks around the holidays, which was very. Didn't you double your user base like in one week just by being launching an Xbox was a huge amount of growth for us.
And we were really surprised by that. We didn't really do any marketing. It was a pretty soft launch in terms of how much noise we made about it. But there was a lot of pen up demand there. The mobile app was clicking, and it's been the fastest growing group. And then you see VR starting to take off all the while, the UGC,
ecosystem, you're seeing great content getting built and we start paying creators and you just see like all the incentives spin a little bit faster. So it's kind of all of these things kind of clicking at the same time. And I don't know that I could assign. Oh, yeah. And then I guess there was like COVID also happening. Like if kids are only going to school for like two to three hours a day, they have an additional couple hours to play video games. And that's largely what they're doing with it.
And so we saw all these converging factors and it was really like, wow, hey, the business is doing very interesting things during the last months of the year here.
But like, I guess the thing to take away from this and I would tell anybody else that's like starting a company is these are things that we started talking about like 2017 and it's like 2021 and it's like, okay, well now it's not a miracle that needs to happen anymore. It's like a system that exists and now we need to like optimize it. But like very little, very few things that are like worth building can be built quickly.
You guys are ever a testament to that. We can get into whatever level detail you want. The whole dynamics I imagine must have been so different going from, hey, we need to raise money in the beginning to build this thing to them. We need to raise money. It's still a story. We're building this thing that now you don't need to raise money. To case in point, a couple of months after your last raise, you're insiders.
Let's have a lot more money at a much higher valuation. What did that felt like? Did you see this transition commenting as a CEO? Or has it been surprising as it's kind of happened? Oh, I mean, I think it's definitely been surprising. I mean, I think the entire ride of Rec Room has been surprising. And when I look back at
what I was thinking during all of these different months in the past. I was wrong a lot. I was wrong all the time. I think the thing that we built was that we built a really robust organism that could survive me being wrong a lot. That's what Recroom is. I don't need to be very right about what's VR going to do this quarter because our businesses depend on that. I don't need to build
like the best room in Rackroom this quarter to drive growth because like users are publishing, I don't know, 25, 30,000 rooms a day. So like there's plenty of content there. And I don't need to worry about like what's our next revenue generation tool because we've built tools for users to go figure that out and they're experimenting.
And so when we were fundraising, I think there's a lot of times, like most of our fundraisers, we were just like, look, we're playing for time. We think we're at a point where we can fundraise and we think that the combination of the partner, the plan and the price match up, we like the partner, we're willing to
enter into a marriage with this person. The plan for what we can go build with this money is interesting and has a possibility of inflecting the business. Then the price is a good risk adjusted value for both the investor and us. That was basically the calculus that we've done for every raise. I don't think we ever burned it down to
We have two months to live, and if we don't raise, we were always raising pretty far out from day zero. Then I assume this fund raise felt very different. This fund raise it feels different. This was not like, hey, it would be nice to have more cash. This was the first time you didn't approach an investor, but an investor approached you. Was it fair to say that?
I mean, they're insiders, so it's a constant communication. No, I think that's accurate. I mean, the dynamics of this round were really, I think it was an internal gut check for us of like, do we think we can build something that's going to last for decades? And if we are, what's that plan look like? What does this look like as a standalone business? What is it going to take from a capital perspective to get this to a standalone business? And then if it's really going to endure, what is the scale that it needs to get to?
And I think we just kind of worked backwards from there. We were like, OK, it's going to take a lot of money. It's going to take a lot of time. It's going to take a lot more people than we have right now. And if we can be patient about it, we think there's a huge business that can be built here. It's just going to take money in time. And we've seen what the oscillations of the market look like.
We've seen the peaks of VR happiness. We've seen the, the trials of VR unhappiness. Like the same thing might happen here. Like meta versus might be hot this year. They might.
Shrow next year for two years. Roblox is a $40 billion company on the public markets today. A year ago it was a $4 billion company. Yeah, you just don't know. Totally. This is our opportunity to untether ourselves from the emotions of the market and really take a long-term play here. I think that was really the question we asked ourselves. What does it look like to
What does it look like for, for Rec Room to be, you know, 100, 500 times bigger, five years from now, 10 years from now, what's it going to take?
And I'm thinking a lot about listeners out there who have fundraise for their startups and they always, you know, there's the deck and then one of the later slides is a use of proceeds. And you always got to say like, here's what we're going to do with the money. And then here's the milestones we're going to hit with the money. And when you have a very different fundraise like this that is an offer coming to you, like do you have to have a plan to use the money or is it okay to say like, we may not spend all this money. Like we might go public with this much money in the bank still and, you know, just like Zoom and that's okay.
Well, I can tell you, I mean, there are a lot of things about Rec Room that are probably idiosyncratic, and like, there are many things that we did that I would probably advise other startups not to do. But we've always been kind of vague around use of proceeds, like in past rounds, because we were kind of like, well, that's the charm of Rec Room is like, there's not really like,
We're making it up as we go along. We'd point to the past. Here's things that we thought we were due that we didn't, and here's things that we never thought we would do that we did. I can make up a slide for you and show you what those things seem like today, but know that these could change. We were always upfront about that.
It's self-selected. There were some people that were like, this is bananas. What are you guys doing? This is your deck. This is crazy. And then I think other people are like, well, this is a refreshing level of honesty because I've been in enough board meetings to know that none of these plans survive contact with reality. So for this particular one, yeah, I think there was more conversation around how big do we think this thing can get? Realistically, what do we think of the value of this thing can be?
I think, you know, I spent time like, I basically like write little notes to myself over the years of like, here's how I'm feeling on this day. And like, here's what I'm thinking. And, you know, when I look back, things always took longer than I thought, but they were always bigger than I thought. That was kind of like the, like if I could write one lesson for like all the things that I was looking at over the years, it was, I was always like, man, I wish this thing was happening faster. Man, I wish this thing was happening faster. But then when it finally did happen, I was like, oh, wow, this is so much bigger than, I thought this was going to be like a,
50% increase and it's like a 10x increase. So you're probably out ahead on an IRR basis, even though it took longer. Yes, exactly. Yeah. It's just like, I think we don't do a good job of thinking about nonlinear growth, like humans.
And so this was an opportunity to like, okay, how do I protect myself against my own biases and inability to predict? Like, okay, well, having a lot of money, hiring great people, making it clear to them what the problems are, and then stepping back. Like this money lets us do that. And it also...
It also puts you into a league that I think helps with recruiting in a lot of ways. There's certain dollar amounts, there's certain valuation amounts where you're like, well, I'm not joining a startup that might not be here in a year, which I think is definitely a fear that many people in Seattle have. If you're working at Amazon or Microsoft, any startup seems impossibly small, whether it's two people or 100 people. This was one that I think
We thought could help a lot of people in those bigger companies get comfort about, okay, like I'm going to go join this company. It's legit. It's going to stay around for a while, but they're still really taking risks and thinking big. Like we wanted to have it both ways. So this allowed us to do that. And you're like 60, 70 people. Do I have that right? We're like about 90 now. We're hiring a lot. Cool. Well, David, do we want to move on to powers?
Yeah, that's what I was thinking. Um, so long term listeners in the show obviously know we're huge fans of Hamilton, Helmer and seven powers. And one thing we like to do when we, you know, just been in me, analyze companies is we, we decide what, you know, we go through the seven different powers of, uh, that companies can have according to Hamilton and we identify which powers companies have. I don't think we've ever done it live with a CEO before, but if you're ready to be a guinea pig,
Sure, go for it. Let's do it. The seven are counter positioning, scale economies, switching costs, network economies, process power, branding, and cornered resources. Maybe I'll jump in first.
We did that LP show on Roblox, and I'm trying to remember exactly what I said there, because I don't see why it would be a lick different in this case. I know I argued fervently for something, and I'm trying to remember what it was, so I don't contradict myself and be like, I know. Oh, yeah, we're on the spot. Well, okay, so I'm going to go first selflessly to give Nick a break to think selfishly to take the incredibly obvious one of network economies.
It's not just a network economies, but it's a network economy with the layer of rec tokens in your own currency as well. The way to think about network effects, network economies, is as more users get added to the system, it grows value for all the other users in the system.
Great. But the thing about it is, there's a multiplier, like I'm thinking about an algebra equation. There's like a, there's a constant that you have to put in front of that value, which is how much value does each incremental use their generation? A coefficient one might say. What's the coefficient? Exactly. Yeah. Thank you, Ben. What's the coefficient? And for something like rec room, the coefficient I think is actually really quite high because you have such a high
conversion rate from user to creator. And once you become a creator, then that value that you're adding back into the ecosystem, obviously there's a scale. Some people are adding tons of value. Some people are adding little value, but overcoming that hump to become a creator then enables more super creators. That's my thoughts.
I'm going to let Nick go next because he's had a long time to think. You just want to go last. I think we talk about scale economies a lot. I think that's what we, especially for our creators, we're like, you know, the bigger rec room is the more people you're theoretically reaching. And so the higher your potential reward is.
a viral hit in Rec Room is worth X today, and we hope it's 1,000 X a couple years from now. And so I think that contributes a lot to the... If you're a creator, you want to jump on these ecosystems early while they're growing to try and get the value from that. You're like, okay, now it's achievable for me to chart. If I wait a while, maybe it won't, and the value in the future will be so much greater. So if I can get that positioning now, I can benefit from the scale later.
Do you guys do? We should ask this before. Do you do any highlighting of creators to the user base? Oh, 100%. Yeah. We select like featured rooms every week. We're constantly looking for a way. Like I would say, if you come into Rec Room, you'll see a mix of like here is an algorithmically generated list. And then here is an editorial list that's selected by staff.
And are you looking for either in the algorithm or editorial, a combination of established creators that you know this stuff is awesome and new creators to kind of keep constantly seating the ecosystem and giving new people a chance?
I mean, we run contests all a good example would be like every quarter we run a contest where we're like, I think the last contest we ran was like movie magic. So we're like, okay, build a room around the concept of movie magic can be like a scene from one of your favorite movies or can have like some cinematic flair to it or something like that. And we actually do like an in-game ceremony where we're like, okay, the best,
horror room was this and you get to come up and take your trophy and give a little speech. It's called the roomies. One of the ones that we highlight is the emerging creator. Who haven't we never seen in a contest before that has really impressed us? Because
Yeah, like two contests later, those people are like the masters of Rec Room tools and they're teaching classes in Rec Room about how to use these tools and bend them to their will. So yeah, I mean, we're really on the lookout for that like young, nascent talent for sure. And we've hired actually quite a few people that have like work at Rec Room today where people that were in the community and we were like, good God, they're building like amazing stuff. That's so cool.
I wonder if they would come and give us feedback on the tools we're building, or help us test them to make sure we're not breaking them, or explain the way that the tools work to other players, like teach classes in Recroom. Recroom has been, we keep an eye on it, one, because it's valuable for the ecosystem, and two, it's a great source of hiring.
Right. The only last one that I was thinking about was, do you guys think you have switching costs? Apple Podcast has switching costs over David and I. If we were to move and be like, OK, we're done with podcasting. We're going to be YouTubers now. We would never do that because we've sunk so much into this investment-wise. It would take us years and years and years to rebuild the same sort of not only audience, but frankly, understanding for the medium on something that's not podcast.
Does the same thing happen to creators in Rec Room? Oh, I think so. I mean, I think there's the way that you build in Rec Room is just so unique. And it lets a group of people that otherwise can't create, create. Like every other tool like Unity or Unreal or even Roblox Studio just feels really, really different from Rec Room. And so I think it's hard to transfer those skills over. That non-transferability, though, is also the thing that lets all those people
who couldn't otherwise create, but yeah, I think once you, especially once you build up your audience, like if you have tens of thousands of subscribers in rec room and they get notified every time you build a new room as well, like there's a cost to switching to another platform where you maybe don't have that audience and you don't have that notification engine. Yeah. The last one I want to, uh, we'll be remiss if we didn't at least ask you. I suspect I know there. Well, I'm going to ask you first.
Is there an element of counter positioning here versus Roblox relative to the age of your user base? Remind me what counter positioning is? Maybe. Counter positioning is if you are doing something in your product or business that if you're a competitor, if you're established entrenched, you know, incumbent and competitor did it. It would torpedo their business.
or at least be value destructive to them such that it's not economically worth them chasing you into the thing that you're doing. Yeah, I don't know if that's true. I mean, I think Roblox
They definitely have a very young user base, and I think they're trying to grow up with that user base. I don't know that there's anything we're doing that necessarily precludes them from doing that. I think we think of Rec Room as fairly distinct from Roblox. Roblox has more of a two-sided marketplace where there's two independent groups like creators and consumers.
Those groups are separated by probably like a 20-year age gap. It's like there's nine to 12-year-old players, and then the creator base is probably like, you know, mid-20s, 30s, maybe older, like you're coding. You're using a game engine. And Recroom kind of just sits in between there. We're like, hey, we just want like teens who basically want to play games or create games, and you can do both of those in the same session. So I think that the difference between us is maybe more
Maybe like Instagram is very different than Photoshop, right? Like Photoshop has a more powerful tool set, but you know, the people that are looking at the content that are produced in Photoshop and the people that are working in Photoshop, it's not the same group, but Instagram, it's probably closer like, well, you know, I could be a creator, I could be a consumer. Tools are pretty simple. I think we kind of sit more in that category. I love that analogy. It's funny. I thought you were going to say difference between Instagram and Facebook and the networks and the ages, but yeah, no, I like that analogy even better.
Well, I want to jump into a section here that's the, it's an acquired staple. What would have happened otherwise? And this is an opportunity, Nick, if there's any that you're comfortable sharing with, is there any counterfactual that's that we should talk about, you know, this could be that the company got acquired or that the company shut down or, you know, you decided to sign some big partnership. Anything happening when history turned on a knife point.
I think the ones that probably jump out in my mind were, it was a very intentional choice to, like, I think we could have buried our head in the sands with the VR thing and we were like, look, we've had success to date every, you know, sign is pointing to this being problematic, but like, damn, the torpedo is full steam ahead. And I think that would have been a really bad idea. I think we probably would have run out of money and like,
2019, look, there are plenty of other, I don't need to come up with a counterfactual for that one. I think there's other companies out there that have proved that for me. So I'm really happy we made that choice. It was tough though, like that was really, really tough. That was tough for the community. It was tough for the team too, because I mean, I think, you know, the team is really sensitive to like what the community thinks of Rec Room. It really means a lot to them. And so if we ever make any changes where the community is not happy, like,
Man, I feel it like in my stomach. I wake up with it every day. It really pains me. And there were a couple months of that for sure.
I mean, you were, you were in a little bit of a Kobayashi Maru situation where like the, if you had buried your head in the sand and gone, VR, VR, VR, like you would have died. If you had completely pivoted and be like, we're going to be an app, then you wouldn't nearly have the power that you have today as a business. And you decided, Hey, there's, there is a door number three, like we don't have to pick between these two kind of impossible, neither are good options.
Yeah. And I think even when we were making that choice, we were like, are we just fooling ourselves to think that this is really going to work? I'm so happy that we did. You didn't know. We definitely did not. And then at various points in Rec Room's life when it has been
harder to find growth or harder to find investment capital. We have had chats with various folks about like, hey, does it make you never need to worry about financing again? Just come into the big warm arms of the big tech company and we can figure this out for you.
And I don't know what that looks like. I think the moment that you accept that, you're giving up your agenda for someone else's agenda. It's no longer our rec room. It's no longer the community's rec room. Some large company is buying it for a goal or an agenda that's not ours. And so I think it really depends on what the company is to figure out if that aligns.
I would say to date, we've never lined up like, hey, we think this isn't everyone's best interests to join powers with this other thing. And actually, it's been great. I think that was one of the things that really attracted us to this round was like, hey, there isn't a capital deficit that we need to go solve. We can just go build. That's what I was going to say. I think that's one of the things that I hope in a few years when we all look back on this period in history,
You know, we may be laughing a little bit at the exuberance in the market that, you know, certainly lots of people talk about. And I don't mean with regard to, you know, I think your valuation is incredibly well deserved and you've been on such a journey and like the business is great. Like if you're... Yeah, the market's hot. Let's be clear. If you're listening to this podcast and you think about raising money, like now is not the worst time to do it. Yeah. No, no, it's the time. But I do think I hope that this will be a really good enduring outcome of it, which is that
You don't have to sell your company anymore. Things are working. Even if you think things can work in the future, you don't have to ever sell because you can raise money in the private markets. That's been true for a while, but you can also be public now. Ben and I've talked about this a bunch of some theme on the show. There are so many more
five to $20 billion tech companies out there and will be out there than anybody ever realized. Whereas I think before this era, it was kind of like, okay, great, you're going to sell your company for a lot of money to a big tech company, or you're going to be one of the very, very few that can be an enduring standalone big business. And I just don't, I don't think that dichotomy exists anymore. Hmm. I think it's a good point. Yeah. I mean, I think especially on the consumer side with more
I think you've seen more consumer apps shift away from the advertising model. And I think the advertising model really was like...
there will be one. There's so many parties involved having a subscale ad business just sucks. You're just going to have a bad business and you're going to have an inefficient marketplace. It's a testament to what Google and Facebook built. Those are on a saleable business. And having one-tenth of their scale is worth one-one hundredth of the value they have.
you're pushing the, that's the sisyphus pushing a boulder up a hill, you're never going to make it, right? It's just never going to happen for you. And I think with more companies, especially on the consumer side going, like, hey, we are not going to use an advertising model, it's just going to be this different exchange of value, you can often build better businesses at smaller scales.
And they're not as subject to, like, winner-take-all sort of mentality. So I think that's what you see in the gaming space. There's, like, a lot of very big, profitable games. There's not just, like, one game. But it's not as true in the social media space. There is, like, one ring to rule them all.
That's a really great point, especially as social media heads into the world of microtransactions and a little bit away from advertising. I mean, assuming that the next generation of social media is VR and AR, then it's very likely that there's going to be a direct supported model of the next sort of platform where everyone spends time interacts with each other.
You know, I'm probably like under educated on this, but my impression is that the market in China is less advertising driven like a 10 cent. And I'm curious to know like how that's affected the dynamics of like, does it create more room for smaller companies to shoot up?
It's hard to say with the sheer number of people. There's definitely a lot more medium-sized companies shooting up, but yeah, to what to attribute is. It's kind of like your comment earlier. Five things are happening all at the same time, and it's kind of hard to have attribution. Before we move on, Nick, I want to ask you sort of one
I think because you're a friend, I feel comfortable asking this on the show, but the warm embrace of a big company is a very rational decision for founding teams to make, particularly economically. And is there something you feel as you sort of look at yourself or your co-founders from a personality characteristic where you're like, that actually probably played a role in us deciding to stay independent? Hmm. That's a reasonable question. I guess I've never.
maybe examine it as deeply as I should. I mean, look, I think anybody in my shoes is trying to, like the larger these things get, the more incentives, like the more people that have incentives in these sort of decisions. And at this point, I'm always trying to find choices that align well with
the community that's playing rec room, the people who are working at rec room, and the investors who have invested. I think the longer you go, the thing that got you here was betting on yourself. The thing that got you here was betting you could keep making it bigger and bigger. When you come to those crossroads, you're like, well, hey, this thing has worked for me in the past.
Do we take the chips off the table or do we double down? Well, doubling down has been the right choice for X long and it's worked out for the parties involved. And so I think it's just like, that's the decision that we've gotten comfort with for X many rounds so far. And so it's not to say that we'll never get comfort with, you know, maybe tying up with a big company, but
I think we've been through enough good and bad that we're like, look, there could be bad coming and that bad could last for two years. But we know there's going to be a bright spot on the other side and we won't get demoralized. And we've seen the team hold together through those storms. And so I don't worry about it as much as maybe I did for a while. I think a lot of people worry like, oh, everything we're going to we've built could disappear in six months. And I definitely worried about that more like in the early stages of the company where I was like,
Man, it feels like this could all disappear, like I can't believe we got here.
And then now that I've seen the team really persevere through some dark times, I'm like, OK, the engine that we have built has a lot of grit. So it just makes it tough. I mean, I think when you're chatting with other companies, then they need to believe in what you've built more than you believe in what you've built to make the price work. That's essentially what needs to happen. And I'm pretty bullish. And I think that's just the challenge that you run into. I think the longer you go.
Right. Well, thanks for answering that. Sure. I did. I appropriately like dodge your question. No, it was perfect. It was great. It's a great segue into playbook, which I think we've touched on a lot of themes here.
that don't need to be rehash. But there is one that I really want to highlight here. I can't say enough, at least my perception from the outside, the value this creates, of one single world across platforms,
across, you're not creating a bunch of servers individually like Minecraft or something like that. You have a fluid economy and a fluid set of social experiences that are able to all happen on one single place. And sure you have rooms and rooms have limits, but it seems to me like we've touched on this idea of liquidity or of finding the perfect match between creator and someone experiencing something in rec room.
I just wanted to sort of like pose this question back to you for how much gravitas I give that characteristic of your business. Do you feel that that's sort of as important as I'm drilling in here?
Um, like that this is one cohesive world that's like, oh, yes. Yeah. I mean, I think it is, I think it is really important. I think it's the element that gives you brand, like every picture that anyone takes in rec room is recognizably rec room. I think it's the element that gives you economic control. So people often will ask me, like, what are you going to do anything with NFTs? Or like a couple of years ago, like ICOs or all the craze, like, are you guys going to make a cryptocurrency?
My statements to a lot of people are like, look, the value of those entities is that they are decentralized. Like, that's the value. And the value that Rec Room derives out of its economy and its things is they are centralized. That's the value. So like, we would be throwing that away for a buzzword, right? Like, we don't need decentralized. Like, in fact, we don't want decentralization. We want centralization because it's like paramount. Like, if you think about the economy transition that I was telling you about, like, imagine going through that with like,
like a cryptocurrency, like you'd never be able to do it, right? Right, lobbying 50% plus of the community to be able to flip to your new. I would be subject to like whatever stupidity I put down in my white paper five years ago. And like, I guess that's the, that's the thing that I would, I would.
tell most people, like maybe other people are really good at forecasting. Like I am not, and like that's, we just like face that decision head on. And so we're like, okay, how can we build optionality into the business so that when we're wrong, we're not trapped in a corner. And so centralization in that one big world gives us a lot more control over being when we're right and when we're wrong. We have a lot more levers to like try and shift the game or the economy or the
the ranking algorithms to favor activities or actions we care about. It makes a lot of sense. The other one that I do think is worth just highlighting here, because it so dramatically affected the trajectory of the business, is the realization you had that your growth was governed by someone else's growth, and by being captive to one platform and betting on that future,
To the extent that you make the decision to become a venture funded business where the capital you're taking is expensive and it is intended for ultra high growth businesses, you become a business that needs to go seek growth. I don't want to put on you that capital was dictating that to you. I think that was a goal of yours too, but it does strike me that
There's a lesson in there for other entrepreneurs where they can sort of look and say, in the business that I'm starting, am I in control of my own growth or is my growth governed by someone else?
When we first started a company, I had never heard of a series A round. I had never heard of, I didn't know how you pitched investors. Actually, probably one of the best stories that I think I've got is Madrona who led our B round. I went to pitch them for a seed round. They were like,
This was not very good. This was bad. I didn't make it to the next meeting. I emailed them back and was like, can I come back next week? I've worked on my pitch and they were like, no, that's not how this works at all. But that's how dumb we were. Was they David? They were not David. No, this is before I met David. It was so funny because when Nick and I did beat later and I didn't know Nick had talked to other folks.
And then I told everybody, oh, man, this company said people are like, wait, we're talking about the same person here? So I think the learning curve was sharp. We just started at zero. Our first couple interactions with Venture did not go very well. And so we were also looking for publishers. And so publishers, if you're not familiar, are looking at the game space,
they'll basically pay you per project. So you're like, hey, this is the project I want to work on. It's going to cost me $10 million to do this thing. They're like, great, we'll front the money. You're talking about electronic arts, Activision. Yeah, totally. There's a bunch. We'll front you the money and we'll pay you for this very specific project. And at the end of the project, we want X percent, like we want to get paid back and then we want X percent of the excess capital that this thing brings in.
That can be the right decision for a lot of games. But because of the way it's financed, it really does finance a very specific type of game. You are not going to build a services game that has an uncertain roadmap with that model because you have to know up front, like, hey, two years from now, I'm going to ship this thing. And the moment it ships, I have to step away because I actually can't finance it anymore. The publisher has only financed it for these two years. And so that's where you get these disks that ship. And then the moment it's out the door, you're like, OK, we're on to the sequel for that thing.
because you have no way to finance the continued growth and iteration of the project. And even if you could, the economics are really not in your favor. You're probably splitting the revenue, like 50, 50, maybe worse with the publisher. Probably worse, yeah. It's like a movie. It's like a band of contractors that comes together, has a budget, burns it down, and then there's no more dollars left, and it's not like you could do anything anyway. Yeah, totally. And so I think as a result of interacting more and more with the venture space,
A lot of people are like, oh, well, if you take venture dollars, you're going to be forced to grow. I think you're more like, look, it is a framework for thinking. The returns they're chasing are very specific, and it will force you into a very specific way of looking at the world and making decisions, which is not a bad thing.
are going to swing for the fences. That's the game you're playing. It's about home runs. It's not about buns. It's not about singles. It's about home runs. And so you're playing home run derby. So I think that's just the way to think about it is there are ways to finance any type of project. Just understand that if you have specific ambitions, venture can be right for you or it can be wrong for you depending on what your goals are.
And I think we realized pretty quickly, we were like, look, we don't have a two year plan. We want to work on this for a long time. Like a publisher is never going to be the right choice. Venture has to be the way we're financing it. And this is the things that they're going to expect in terms of like growth and margin. Okay. So like, how do we feed that back into the decision making of like, what is record I'm going to look like? Hmm. I don't think anyone has ever articulated that as well as you just did on this show.
It actually is really, really good. And I think to rabbit hole for one quick is iconic because I think it's something really important there. I think people get a lot of cognitive dissonance looking at the venture market and financings where they're like, there's no plan. How did you guys have no plan and raise all this money? Like, what do you need to plan? You need to plan.
But you had the key point there, which is if you're financing a project in the context of a movie or a traditional game studio, whatnot, yeah, you need a plan, like because there's a set amount of money and you need a set, you know, return on that afterwards.
But that's not what venture is about. Venture is about the long-term asymmetric uncapped upside potential. And the way you can oftentimes, the way you can best realize that is exactly by not having a plan. And by the time you're like, oh, shoot, OK, VR market dried up. All right, what are we going to do? We've got to find that growth. Well, we're going to go to screens, et cetera, et cetera.
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Okay, Nick. So the way we're going to do grading, since we're not like grading the transaction here, is to speculate, you know, what is the, what does the A scenario for a rec room look like three years from now? And I think there's an obvious F scenario, like, you know, we could,
Those are less interesting because lots of numbers could go to zero and anything multiplied by zero is bad. But what's the B minus scenario? What worries you on stagnation or how do things just plateau? But before we get there, let's talk about the AA+. What in the world happens for this thing to just go gangbusters? I think if you look at the video game space, there's a couple video games that have
transcended video games, right? Like they are part of popular culture. Minecraft, Fortnite, Roblox, Mario, like these things, like everybody knows what these things are. They have impacts.
well beyond gaming. And so I think that's what the A scenario for Rec Room is, is like we have grown into a space where Rec Room can have a positive impact well beyond gaming. It can have an impact on what digital entrepreneurship looks like. It can have an impact on what the future of digital events look like, what the future of the metaverse looks like. So that's the space that I'm most interested in is
It's not really a financial outcome and it's not really like evaluation or we've IPO'd or we've made X number of dollars. It's really like what, what is the lasting impact that the brand and the product that we've built has, you know, beyond the gaming space? I think that's really what, what I focus on. And would that primarily be attributed to this sort of like, uh, creator led growth strategy going well?
I think it's probably like how high up can we keep ramping those incentives for creators. Because right now we're like, okay, we're paying out X.
and X buys us this style of creator spending this amount of time on their thing. If we can 2X that, do they quit their job and then focus on this exclusively? If we can 10X that, do they quit their job and convince five other people to quit their job and form a team to build this content?
So I think it's like how high up that ladder can you build? Look, if you're a platform, the true test of whether you're a platform is, are other people building a business on top of your business? That's, you're only a platform if that's true. And I think the question is like, okay, well, how big is the business somebody could build on top of a rec room? Love it. And then the B minus, what keeps you up at night? How could things sort of just, hey, this is the top? I mean, I think the B minus is like, it's so easy to get complacent. Like it's so easy to be like, look at all the things that we've done.
We crossed ex like we defeated these challenges. And I think if you spend too much time thinking about the battles you won, you know, you don't want to be that guy that like peaked in high school and is like still talking about how they ran back some kickoff and, you know, their homecoming game. Like I think it's really easy to become that as a startup where you're like, we did this thing. It is. It's so is. Yeah.
So I think it's especially challenging as you grow as well, like continuing to find people that want to push the boundaries of what's capable here, like keep taking ownership. And so I think the B minus scenario for us is just like, oh, man, we get really content with like patting ourselves on the back and like being so proud of what we've done. Anytime you're raising money, I think you have that temptation here, like,
I can view this as an end point. Look at the success that we've achieved. It's this number on that number. Or you can view it as like, OK, the game just started again. We just put all of our chips onto the table like time of play. And so that's what we need to do to avoid that B minus one is like, you know, you've got to keep experimenting. You've got to keep growing. I love it. Love that.
All right, well, carve outs, Nick. Mine is someone sent me invent and wander, which was like a collection of writing from Bezos and was sort of organized by Walter Isaacson. And it's Bezos over, I don't know, like two decades. And the consistency and like,
the long-term thinking that you can just see it through the writings. It's like, this guy was writing about this in like the late 90s, you know, and you're just seeing it play out today.
I think looking at the writings of Bezos over a long period of time just gives me a new respect for the vision and the determination that that guy has exercised over just such a long period of time. I think it's really easy for people to forget. There was a decade when that business was like
the smaller unloved stepchild of eBay, where everybody's like, well, eBay is like the really good business. Look, eBay has the superior model. It's a marketplace, not the retailer. And I remember that. And I remember nodding along reading these articles of like, yeah, obviously, Amazon, how anachronistic,
You know, managing your own inventory like that's crazy. And then you look at what they built it in today and I think they just they just slogged it out over years and years and years. I think that's how many of the tech companies go is like for a long period of time people are like.
Oh, this valuation is crazy. And like, this doesn't make any sense. And why are people wasting money? And they don't make any money to like, Oh my God, it's way too powerful. Shut it down. Yeah. It's crazy how quick it can switch. And I think Bezos just, it's clear he has had this idea in his head the entire time, especially looking back at these old writings. It's just very impressive.
That's awesome. I love it. It's such a good place to list. My carve out is so appropriate for this episode on so many levels. It is my new favorite YouTube channel called Resonant Arc. Have you guys heard of this Nick? No, I haven't. Oh, you got a lot of it. OK, so it's like.
They do a whole bunch of stuff on there. They're way, obviously way better at video production than we are required, but they're like somewhat like so nerdy, super, super, super deep dives on video games and what got me hooked. I'd sort of casually watched it for a while, but what got me so hooked was
They just did a massive five part series. Each episode is like three hours long about Final Fantasy eight, which like I remember playing as a kid, the day it came out and then like got it, the day came out and then played several times as an adult. It's such a, if you played this game, you know, it's a very controversial game unlike all the other Final fantasies. And they just like these guys go to town like 15, 20 hours worth of content digging into this game. It's awesome.
Squall, Lee and Hart, the main character, right? Yeah. Oh, so controversial. All right. I didn't realize it was the first Final Fantasy with a different director at the helm from all the previous ones, which is why it was so different. The more you know.
All right. Mine is a YouTube video that I finally watched that I've had on my to-do list forever. And then I was catching up with someone who reminded me that I should be, uh, it's actually someone who listened to our Bitcoin episode and had some, some feedback and we were catching up and they reminded me you should watch this video. And, um, it's called How the Economic Machine Works by Ray Dalio. If either of you ever watched this, I don't think I maybe did a while back.
It's unbelievably succinct, it's unbelievably digestible at any level. You're both four notches above the economic understanding necessary to understand this video, but it's basically a 30-minute primer on the economy. We got three big things that happen over time. One, you have productivity growth. Two, you have short-term debt cycles, and clearly we're experiencing that right now.
you're always experiencing it. On top of that, you've got the long-term debt cycle. He explains recessions, depressions, all the different levers that the Fed has, that the government has, that wealth redistribution has, and when each of these different things are appropriate, it's just a crazy, succinct way to understand
how to zoom out from our current conversation around, oh, no, it's a bubble. And say, well, actually, what tends to happen over several hundred years out of an economy, especially ours, here in the US? And where might we be in the accommodation of these three factors in our current one? And it's old, too. It's from 2012 or something. So it's not written for people pining to understand right now, which I think
gives it a little bit more authority. And so I highly recommend it. We'll only get in the show notes. Well worth your time. Well, with that, Nick, thank you so much for joining us. Thanks for having me. What do you want to plug? What should listeners go check out?
Go check, go check out Rackroom. Yeah. Yeah. You see, we told you you could have just made directly in your car valve. Yeah. Yeah. Go check it out. Send us feedback. Like the, the app is far from done. Um, and so we're always interested in people's feedback. Awesome. Well, Nick, we, we hope to have you back for, for part three someday. And I don't want to foreshadow what, what event that could even happen, but let's just say the, in the far future.
What about Nick, what about if people want to get involved in record more deeply? They want to work with you. They want to get in touch with you, partner with you guys. What's the best way to? We are hiring. Yes, for sure. So we would love it if you go to recroom.com. There's a bunch of jobs listed on there. There's new ones being posted every week.
We would love to have you as part of the team. I think we've found there's so much untapped potential, especially in the Pacific Northwest with the really, really big tech companies. I think you see that there's like all the talent and startup ambition in the San Francisco space. And there's like all the talent up in Seattle, but like there's not as much of that spark. And I think there's so many people at a Microsoft or an Amazon or a Google or a Facebook that would enjoy their life more who are listening.
Yeah, who would enjoy their life more on the startup journey. I mean, I wouldn't want a lot of them higher highs, lower lows, but definitely like a much more rewarding journey when you're sitting at the end of a five year journey and looking back. I think there's like a lot more. It will certainly make your life much more interesting. I'll take it for Mick and I, both for Microsoft.
This is another thing that Dan Lewis brought up during our convoy episode. I just have to say it one more time. You always overweight the risk of joining a startup. You always think, oh my gosh, this is so risky. But your downside is wildly capped. You could just go get your old job or probably a better one. And if it goes, well, God forbid, who knows what unforeseen doors that opens in your future? Oh, for sure.
I think when most people are calculating, like what is going to happen at a startup or what is going to happen to me at Microsoft, like they're using the law of averages. And so I just ask them like, okay, are you average? Like, do you think you are an average person? Like, because it's some serious jujitsu. Wow. I love it. Well, I mean, like, look, I think then the math makes a lot of sense. Like, if you
Yeah, if you feel like you're going to be subject to that log of averages and you're going to score in the middle, like Microsoft's a great spot. If you do think you're in the top 25 or the top 10%, like your upside's really capped at Microsoft.
There is only so fast you can grow there. There's only so much responsibility you can get over such a short period of time. And so that's not true at startups. And so if you really feel like your career is capped in some way, I think people, I tell them like, hey, the risk is really worth it. Like you really can find a lot more responsibility and a lot more ownership and have a lot more impact on a product.
Ben and I would be remiss if we didn't also throw in also applies to starting a company for most people. Totally. No, no. If you don't start a company, go work a record. Exactly. To go back to Bezos, the regret minimization function that he uses, which is like, hey, when I'm looking at any decision and I think about
You know, what am I going to feel in five years when I look back on this choice? And people tend to regret the decisions that they, you know, they didn't jump at, not the ones that they let pass. Yeah. Totally. It's a great framework. You're like stealing all these future potential carve outs. All right, listeners, we're going to wrap here. We told you about the Slack, go check it out, acquire.fm slash Slack. We'll be talking about this episode. If you want to be an LP that's at acquire.fm slash LP and you should. And frankly, if you are not subscribed or soon to be called following,
as we are finding out, subscribed is going to be a reserved word for paid podcasts. And following is what happens when you follow free podcasts. You should follow us from your favorite podcast player. And if you like this episode and you have a friend or coworker that you think, Hey, like I thought of them during this episode, share it with them. We would love to have them join the acquired community. With that, we will see you next time. See you next time. See ya.