I'm Dom Nichols and this is Ukraine the latest. Today we look at some of the ways the war is likely to develop in 2025 and report on Russia's decision to ban cryptocurrency mining to protect its energy grid and charge nightclub attendees for trying to arouse interest in non-traditional sexual relations. How portentous will 2025, the year of the snake in the Chinese calendar denoting a period of upheaval, be for Russia?
Travery takes you through the most unimaginable hardships to finally reward you with victory. The first duty of my government is security and defence to make clear our unshakable support of NATO and with our allies towards Ukraine. Keep stand strong. Nobody's going to break us. We're strong. We're Ukrainians.
It's Thursday the 2nd of January 2025. Two years and 319 days since the full-scale invasion began. And today, I'm joined by the executive editor for audio, Francis Durnley.
I last spoke to you folks on Monday. It was the last live of 2024. A bit of a sort of look back then. So Francis and I today we're going to do as well as the news. Why are we going to do a brief look forward? Any main sort of muscle moves that we expect in 2025. But I'll start with the news.
So the head of Ukraine's armed forces, General Alexander Sursky, he says that Russian forces have suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024. He was actually speaking on Monday, just after we were on air. An analysis by the Institute for the Study of War says that that number mostly consists the area that Russia took in 2024.
Mostly consists of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and a little bit of Russia, Kursk and occasional bits of Belgrade, remember those sort of cross-border raids. They cite geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advance 4,168 square kilometers last year. Over half of that coming between September and November, we think those sort of meat assaults in the Donbas that we've been witnessing.
Now that rate of advance has slowed, ISW say that slowed to 18 square kilometers a day in December, for which they suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,585 personnel. That last statistic coming from Ukraine's general staff, but broadly similar to figures that Western officials are citing.
Now, British Defence Intelligence says that Russian casualties now stand over 760,000. You may remember Russia passed a law in November 2024 that said anyone joining up after December 1st, would have debts written off of up to 10 million rubles. That's just over 94,000 US dollars. That's for the individual and a spouse.
Now the British MOD says that that is so that the Kremlin doesn't have to do another round of mobilisation, which is seen as very damaging to public support for the war.
The ISW is saying that the Russian military command have likely tolerated these record levels of personnel casualties for such little gain on the ground, especially between September through November, to facilitate the larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian High Command are going to be willing to or able to sustain such casualties if the rate of advance continues to decline.
The ISW assessment is that Russia's aim throughout 2024 was to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Harkiv Oblast. That push, you may remember, over the border in the vicinity of Vovchansk and Lipsky, which went nowhere fast.
Now then, Russia starts this year, seemingly still relying on very small tactical fighting formations. I'm talking platoon level, so 30-ish soldiers, company of about 100, very occasionally battalion-sized assaults, a battalion, an infantry battalion, if you like, typically of about 400-500 people. Depends on the role, et cetera, but about that sort of size.
So those are very small tactical formations. They are still basically relying on the meter salts, which is understandable, as in the opinion of Western officials, Russia is just about replenishing in numbers what they're losing at the front. So the number of people there actually get signing up through, quote unquote, training, very small tea training.
is what they're losing at the front. The quality of that training, the equipment that people are given and the leadership is bad and likely declining. Now Russia is still and will continue to for 2025, I think, use armored vehicles, so tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,
armoured personnel carriers, the difference between those last two being an armoured personnel carrier is there, sometimes called a battle taxi. It's basically designed to get the soldiers into the fight, whereas an IFV, an infantry fighting vehicle can actually take part in the fight itself. An APC needs to get the hell out of the way pretty quickly.
But even though they're using such vehicles, I think it is a very generous statement to say that Russia is capable now of mounting armored or even mechanized assaults. An armored assault being sort of tank heavy, mechanized being just, I say, the battle taxes to get you to the fight.
Now, if you wanted to have a combined arms assault, that would imply a level of coordination with other units to your left and right, and also other arms of the military, artillery engineers, air defence, so on and so forth. There's very, very little evidence for that at the moment, and I don't think Russia are going to be able to develop that in 2025.
They seem to be using their armoured units just as part of the metre salts, so rushing the tanks at the Ukrainian lines, blasting away, hoping to create a space for the infantry behind to come in and hold. That's not really happening. It is very small, as we say, 18 square kilometers a day across the whole country in December. I mean, it's just woeful and at great cost.
Russia's losing lots of vehicles. We've seen them using motorbikes, civilian cars, and so on and so forth. The priority now, and for the first quarter, I would imagine, at least of this year, the priority seems to be the Donbass. That's the area they've achieved most success in the last year. Procrospe and Valika Novashilka, we spoke about regularly. They are still extremely vulnerable. The latter, more so.
but hardly any movement in the lines of the last few days at all. Drones throughout 2025, especially FPV drones, first-person view drones, still a major threat and will get more so, I think, particularly when both sides work out away as they've been developing in the last few months around the electronic warfare jamming. That's increasingly the case. A lot of drones now FPV drones are using fiber optic cabling, spooling out the back of the drone.
So if you just fly with remote control, then that radio link, the remote control link can be jammed, it can be hacked all the rest of it and the drone can fly into the ground or do other bits and pieces. But if you've got cable coming out the back, through which the pilot is controlling the drone.
I mean, it's impossible to interdict basically. You just have to shoot the thing down. We are seeing that type of drone used increasingly on the front lines. Some of these drones can go up to 10 kilometers. That's a huge distance when you think about where the front lines are in relation to each other. You really don't need much more than that. And if drones are capable of flying,
and you've obviously got to keep the fiber optic cable out of the propellers and all that kind of stuff and not get it snagged and caught in a tree and ripped and all that kind of jazz, but that seemed to be managing that. And hence you're getting these drones that are capable of carrying munitions, obviously as well. That's their primary focus. Many kilometers behind the lines. It seems to be the weight of this cable at the moment is about 250 grams a kilometer, so only an extra kilogram
for every four kilometers, you want to try and send these drones. So it's very efficient. The cable itself is very strong and impervious to jamming. So that seems to be the way drones are going to go this year, plus, of course, adding on artificial intelligence in terms of targeting. We've spoken about that before. So the drone itself, even if it loses signal for any reason, if it's jammed or if the cables cut, the drone knows the difference between a square building and a square tank. It knows what to attack.
So, I think fiber optic cabling and AI on drones are going to be the way the innovation will go this year. Speaking of drones briefly, Ukrainian Navy says it destroyed over 37,000 Russian drones in 2024. The vast majority first-person view. Now, that's just the Navy.
As I said, we've started to see drones use much more than just wrecky and strike. We've seen them bringing down other enemy drones. We've seen them laying mines. We've seen naval drones now a threat to air and aviation. So jets and helicopters, I'll speak about that in a moment. And we've seen ground drones used for logistic resupply, casualty evacuation, as well as strike and recovering downed equipment to downed drones.
So, the ground side of drones seems to be relatively immature as in it's a lot harder. You would not be able to spool a fiber optic cable out the back of a ground drone because it'll just get caught on bushes and all the rest of it. But I still think we'll see massive drone innovations throughout the rest of this year.
Back to the assessment by the ISW saying that Russian forces, they're assessing that Russian forces need to capture nearly 8,600 square kilometers to seize the remainder of Donetsk or blast. And that's going to include, or that we'll need to include, significant Ukrainian defensive positions and large cities. Now, they say that Russia would need just over two years on the current rate of advance to seize the remainder of Donetsk. And that's assuming that they prioritized it and didn't try to do
anything more. Very little chance of that happening. The way things are going at the moment. Of course the great big question is what will happen after Donald Trump comes into power after January the 20th and I think Francis will be speaking about that a little bit later.
Now, a couple of other notable updates since we last spoke live. Ukraine's military intelligence director at the GUR, speaking on New Year's Eve, said it had destroyed a Russian MI8 hip helicopter using the Sea Dragon missiles launched from a naval drone, the Magura V5 naval drone in the Black Sea, just off the northwest coast of Crimea. There's not a lot of imagery released online. We're carrying it on our website as well.
There were reports yesterday that that might have actually been two hips, two MI8 hip helicopters destroyed and a third damaged. That regardless of the numbers is very significant. I think a sea drone carrying a or destroying a manned and maneuvering and firing helicopter is very significant.
The GOR said at the time that they brought one down and damaged a second, but it does look like both those numbers have gone up one. Also, around New Year, Ukrainian Special Ops forces launched drone strikes against the Yavskaya oil depot. That's about 400 Ks north of Kyiv continuing their effort there against Russian energy infrastructure.
And just in the last couple of days, Russia started the year, started 2025 by firing 111 drones at Ukraine overnight on New Year's Eve. Into January the 1st, 63 were shot down, 46 brought down by EW. Two people were killed there, a married couple who both worked as scientists, Igor Zima.
was a senior researcher and associate professor at the Institute for Biology and Medicine at the Taraschipchenko National University in Kiev and his wife, Alessia Schulke, also worked at the Institute as a Deputy Director of Scientific Work. So more civilians killed. Then last night attacks killed civilians in Hezon, Zaparizia and Don Yetsch Oblast. Six were killed and many others injured. 72 drones targeted 12 Oblast, but all but one were brought down.
OK, more for me later on, but let's turn to the telegraph's newest employee. Hang on. Well, we've got the executive editor for audio. Francis, what have you been looking at?
Well, thanks, Dom, and Happy New Year. Wherever you're listening from around the world, it's great to be back with you. 2025 marks the year of the snake in the Chinese calendar, a symbol of upheaval. Interestingly, Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the German invasion of 1941, Stalin's death in 1953, and the start of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1989 all occurred in years of the snake.
Now, in 2022, Putin, of course, launched an invasion that has since become the bloodiest war on European soil since the Second World War, unleashing forces that many in the West hadn't seen for a generation. In previous years, in our first episode back, as Dom says, I've tried to offer a broad brush summary of where I think we are and where I think we might be headed on current trajectories. And I'll do the same today, though, as ever.
very much welcome your feedback and would emphasise that history never works cleanly based on predictive patterns. Shock, black swan events could upturn everything I'm about to say. But it is still worth making these assessments because it's these kind of calculations that are happening elsewhere which are dictating foreign policy.
Now, last year, as in 2023, I argued we were deeper into a war of attrition, where each side held onto a definition of victory, which they saw as essential to achieve for their own survival. Publicly, both had, in a sense, maximalist objectives. The Ukrainians sought to defeat Russia and to restore the territory. Moscow had illegally seized.
The Russians sought the elimination of what they called the neo-Nazi leadership in Kiev and the subjugation of the entirety of the country and its erasure as a sovereign entity. In 2024, I argued that despite the horrors, this remained true. Though suggested we might be seeing the first cracks in Western support for Ukraine following the failure of the counter-offensive and war fatigue. But Kiev stood firm in its objectives regardless.
Now, as we enter 2025, I would argue that the cracks have grown and consequently the tone of the conversation has shifted. Discussions of ceasefire and negotiations are rife in Western capitals with Kyiv being obliged therefore to adapt so as not to be seen as trenchant.
A large part of this is due, of course, to the election of President Trump in the United States. Europe failed to craft a robust, independent strategy in 2024 that meant less reliance on Washington. Now, Europe's fate and that of Ukraine remains potentially tied to the goodwill of a presidential administration that might try and enforce a peace that is not in Europe's best interests.
But such talk around negotiations, which many seem to believe is the most likely scenario in the coming months, are predicated on one massive assumption that Russia will meaningfully come to the negotiating table in early 2025.
There are strong reasons to think that they should. Let's we forget that we are seeing a war that was planned as a three-day special operation turn into a three-year nightmare. Russia controls just 20% of Ukraine. It's suffered 700,000 casualties. It's been defeated at sea and in the air. Depends on North Korea for ammunition, and its defense apparatus at home is also shambolic.
Russia has only made minimal progress in its territorial ambitions, struggling to take full control even of Donetsk.
Last year's major offensive to establish a buffer zone around Harkiv barely captured a few kilometres. Attempts to cripple key by launching missile strikes to induce widespread darkness and destroy energy infrastructure has failed. The financial burden of these failures is significant with an enormous military budget and 6% allocated for the care of the wounded and compensation for the families of those killed in action.
This expenditure, alongside the impact of global sanctions, is exacerbating Russia's already struggling economy. Interest rates have, at one point, skyrocketed to 23%, and inflation sits at 9%, leading to rising prices for essential goods, including, as our own on the ground reporting has shown with James Kilner, staples like bread and butter. Beyond Russia's borders, the conflict has also severely damaged the country's international standing.
Putin's earlier involvement in the Syrian Civil War helped solidify Assad's regime. But his decision to scale down Russian forces there in order to focus on Ukraine, coupled with the withdrawal of the Wagner Group, weakened its influence in the region. As a result, Moscow's reputation as a reliable ally has been tarnished.
Furthermore, Russia's diminished influence in Syria has strained its relationship with Iran, a key regional partner there, as well as a crucial ally to Russia. Should Syria become haven for jihadists targeting Russian territory? Of course, Russia was their great foe for many years. The consequences domestically could also be dire.
All the while, the country is becoming more and more dependent on China for economic support due to the impact of sanctions. Only this week Russian gas shipments to the EU via Ukraine ceased entirely, further deepening Russia's dependence on Beijing. Some have argued that already Moscow is effectively a vassal state as a consequence.
So those are the reasons why Putin might be thinking it's in my interest to talk. And yet, he has been in power for 25 years now, a quarter of a century. All dictatorships feel bullish after such an innings, unable to clearly see their own errors. What if the Kremlin, despite these catastrophic losses, calculates that if it continues to wage war and does not meaningfully talk, given Western weakness and division,
it is more likely to benefit if it continues fighting. What if it sees part of its strength domestically at home as a state continuing to be built on this ongoing struggle?
Given the battlefield dynamics and Moscow's objectives, many convincingly argue therefore, and this is important, that Putin will continue waging this war for as long as the economy allows him to do so. The Kremlin might posture as conciliatory in January, claiming openness to meaningful talks. Putin is, after all, canny and will likely want to appear reasonable. But what if his proposals are unacceptable to Ukraine and its allies?
For America, the choice might be easy to arm Ukraine further or to pull out entirely and leave it up to Europe. What then, for a continent which has failed to prepare adequately for that scenario, and yet cannot agree to terms that would strengthen Moscow's ability to influence the free countries in the east of the continent? This seems to me a question that many diplomats there are unable to convincingly answer.
Alternatively, Russia might refuse any concessions outright, leaving Europe unprepared to arm Ukraine independently long-term, while Trump withhold support. Or Putin could feign good faith, dragging out negotiations while the war continues, only to offer a terrible deal. Seed territory with no meaningful security guarantees that Europe or Ukraine could possibly accept.
More optimistically, recent geopolitical shifts, like the collapse in Syria, has emboldened those who argue that dictatorships appear strong until they suddenly crumble. The implications of that are significant given the man poised to return to the White House, a man who backs winners.
Russia's recent defeats may lead him to view Moscow ultimately as a failing power, essentially seeing it as one not worth extending a hand to, especially if its economy enters freefall as some predict.
The best case scenario is that if Moscow refuses to negotiate seriously, the attitude may shift that Kyiv is not a primary obstacle to peace because it's trenchant, but rather it is Moscow that remains unwilling to talk. And that could be the moment that Washington decides to double down on supporting Ukraine, strengthening its leverage on the battlefield and potentially compelling Moscow to negotiate in earnest.
that deficit of support could sharply correct itself. But this is the most positive scenario that's likely, and even if it entails a longer, bloodier war to ensure it takes place. That is why it's proven so disastrous for Europe not to demonstrate its capacity, both in moral terms and military terms, to support Ukraine not only to fight, but to potentially win.
That would have changed Moscow's calculations. Likewise, it underscores the tragedy of military support becoming a partisan issue in the United States rather than one that is predicated if not on morality than on pure self-interest.
Many would argue that on those grounds alone, Europe and the wider West shouldn't be pursuing negotiations but defeat. When you concede principles, you do ultimately end up conceding territory. That territory isn't just geographic, it's political. Russian disinformation pumped into the West as toxifying politics, which Moscow uses to try and influence
in its to its own advantage in Europe's so-called grey zones, such as Georgia and Moldova. Sabotage and terrorism has also increased to a point that Western intelligence chiefs have broken cover to say that Moscow is acting as if it is at war with the West.
All the while, Russia kidnaps thousands of children from the occupied territories, whilst many seem to assume that any territory that's taken by Russia is lost for good. A rather strange mentality, in light of the Second World War, where so many countries fell entirely, but were not considered lost forever. And when we know that the resistance in the occupied territories is still very much active, something I'll come to later on.
For me, therefore, to wrap this up, the pathway to meaningful negotiations, which by their very definition requires both sides to be willing to agree concessions, is not yet in place, and it's harmful to the West's cause, Ukraine's cause, however you want to articulate it, for so many countries to be seeing negotiations as inevitable. Instead, it would be in their best interest to be pledging Kyiv more support
seeing negotiations if they occur as a potential avenue to end the war, but not the only avenue. To rely on negotiations is to seed the strategic initiative to the aggressor.
The ear of the snake, the snake teaches us that sometimes silence and sharp calculated reaction are far more powerful than sign-posted limited responses. That sense of urgent unpredictability has been lacking in the West throughout this war.
But perhaps 2025, a new year of the snake after all, might be when faced with certain realities, certain new actors, calculations, change and reality, bites.
Well, thanks Francis. When you talk about negotiations, we had this report over Christmas that the Trump team, now this was reported from the US so we didn't actually get anything official obviously, but we heard that the Trump team had put together or proposed, floated the idea.
of some sort of peace deal along the lines of no NATO membership for Ukraine for 20 years and no Western peacekeepers on the ground in Ukraine post any kind of settlement. Well, we heard about it mainly from Lavrov and Putin himself who rejected that. So we don't actually know what was being floated, but they outright rejected that.
But very possibly because both sides now see that they're gaining more by the battlefield than by any negotiation. So you wouldn't expect any kind of meaningful engagement there. But I just thought it was interesting that they so overtly and publicly rebuffed that and named it from the Trump team.
We just, we simply don't know. That's the tragic and the great thing about Donald Trump coming in on the 20th of January is that he's, you know, he's Mr unpredictable. We just don't know what's going to happen. But then equally Putin doesn't know what he's going to do. Russia has never negotiated with the West on anything like this scale. I would suggest since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, they've never negotiated this level with Trump as I say, Mr unpredictable. But what we do think, we do think that Trump is much more interested in China
kind of wants to be done with the whole Ukraine thing, wants Europe to take more responsibility correctly, take more responsibility for its own security. So is it wise for Russia to so clearly and overtly just throw back this plan that we're told came from the Trump team, sort of throw it back in his face? Trump might say, well, I'll tell you what, I just want done with this, I'm going to arm Ukraine to the teeth and then I'm going to start looking at China. I think that's the way they are already soft negotiating with
the incoming Trump administration I think is very interesting and I don't think they've I don't I think they're just sticking to type that sticking to what they know which is demand the maximum play the victim card and refuse to take any kind of concessions whatsoever and I just don't think that's going to work I think that's going to work at all I do think it's very interesting the the gas deal so Ukraine shutting off the gas from Russia into that has continued to flow into into Europe that's a very interesting move
There's reports that European gas prices have gone up already by just over 4% to 51 euros per megawatt hour the highest for at least a year and a half and probably going to go go higher And I think that's interesting because we are going to see we in the West are now going to see how serious Western leaders are when they say they're going to stick with Ukraine for as long as it takes We're going to see what for as long as it takes really means here because they're going to have to
explain to us to the populace, to the consumers why we should pay more, why we literally should pay more for our power supply, just as winter gets going here. Because of the Ukraine war, I'm in a lucky position, I'm willing to do so. But that's a conversation that our Western leaders are going to have to have with the people here. And so there's a number of things happening here that make this idea of negotiations.
and the stance on the West and of course the whole big Donald Trump at the back of this. It's just such an interesting dynamic and I think Ukraine has been very clever. Zelensky has been very clever in the way it's courted Trump this time round, especially in negotiations with Syria and all that kind of stuff. I think they've been quite clever. I think Russia have been somewhat
somewhat industrial, shall we say, in their diplomacy of just not engaging, I think maybe they're still reeling from the shock of Syria, but they've not been particularly cute in their public pronouncements regarding any kind of negotiations or anything to do with the Trump team. We are guessing, for instance, we won't overlay by the point, but are you seeing any sign at all of a firmer view of anything that we think Trump might stand on when he comes into power?
Not yet, no. I think we still are very much in a wait and see situation. Of course, the appointments have got some people very excited, some more hawkish individuals there as part of the regime, though one could also say that those individuals have proven their loyalty to Donald Trump fundamentally and it's that that he's looking for and that his calculations could change on a whim and he's
determined that these individuals could carry those out, even if they're not especially hawkish. And yet, as you say, Dom, there is another point here, which is that leverage could be more in the hands of Trump over Russia than over Ukraine. So if we look at the ways in which if Washington sought to seriously damage Moscow's ability to wage war in Ukraine,
It has numerous opportunities, whether it be on sanctions, whether it be on weapons support that could be provided to Ukraine. You name it, America can do it, it has the power to do so. But its leverage over Ukraine specifically and its decisions is quite considerably reduced given the amount of material that's been pumped in by President Biden in the last months of his administration.
And indeed we're seeing that with the way that Ukraine has prepared itself as it were for 2025, that it's saying it would be able to wage war at the current level at least six months into 2025, perhaps longer. That weakens Trump's ability to potentially strongarm Ukraine into certain scenarios.
Certainly not in the long term, but in the short term and I should say that I'm focusing very much in those remarks a moment ago in the short term. It seems to me that there is a mentality at the moment that negotiations are going to begin in late January, early February and we might be seriously talking about a peace deal that is meaningful come March.
As I said earlier on, I do not see that as being the most likely scenario as things stand given where we are. And given all of that and the leverage point, it may well be that because Trump doesn't want to be thinking about Ukraine any longer, that the short-term solution to Ukraine is to arm Ukraine more and compel Moscow to negotiate meaningfully.
But again, we're a long way, I think, from that being seen as likely, where several moves on the chessboard, as it were, away from that being the most likely scenario. But nonetheless, I think it's an important one. But I was going to ask you, Dom, I mean, looking at the military situation at the moment, do you think it is likely that the, say, North Korean presence will be any
significant military factor in early 2025 or from what we've seen is it yet more fodder as it were for the guns and that realistically the support that North Korea is providing that is meaningful is in terms of the ammunition. Have we really seen a profound change on the battlefield calculations as a result of those 10,000 North Korean troops coming in?
No, is a short answer. They've not done much at all. I think it is the material side, the provision of ammunition and how it's in particular, rather than the manpower. The North Korean soldiers have been found to be
I mean, they've sort of taken the metre salt as a sort of tactic of par excellence rather than a sort of desperate measure. They really haven't done anything. The numbers are, as you'd say, we think about 10,000-ish. The lines in Kursk have shifted a bit, but not much at all.
And so no, it's been a political intervention. I can't see that stopping. And if we talk about the numbers of casualties, circa 15 to 1800, a day that Russia's taking, then if they are coming from North Korea, Putin will be happy with that. But no, they really haven't done anything on the battlefield. That's a question.
of can Ukraine keep going? Has it got the personnel to keep going? And as I said at my end of year, look back a few days ago, that is an error of concern about the numbers of people in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their mobilization plan. Are they going to reduce the age of mobilization from 25? No sign of that at the moment. The other thing, of course, is that those soldiers holding the line up in Kursk and elsewhere need the ammunition to putting too far a point on it.
flat pack the North Korean furniture shall we say. So no, it's not really done much at all there. I don't think it will do much.
There were just so many corners being being backed into at the moment. Trump has kind of made a corner for himself when he did the whole, we're going to solve the war out in a day. Those words are going to come back to him in a few weeks' time. We don't know which way he'll go after that. Equally, the utter irreconcilable mantra that we get from Putin about his maximalist aims still and Nazis and drug dealers and all the rest of it.
against what's happening on the front. And somebody eventually is going to say, well, look, you go on about NATO heading eastwards and gobbling up all these countries as if they've got absolutely no agency whatsoever. Someone's going to point out to him that, you know, if NATO is this rampant, aggressive, totally hungry, omnipotent beast, you've got a big problem here, pal, because you've got a totally undefended border with Finland. You've burned your ground army in Ukraine. So if NATO wants to walk in, it pretty much can.
And, you know, if not you, then maybe Belarus. And would you, Russia, go to nuclear war with NATO over Belarus? I think, you know, these are all hypotheticals, I think. But somebody's going to point them out, eventually, or rather, maybe a lot of people in the Russian society will start asking these questions and thinking, oh my God, the emperor, the emperor's got no clothes. Francis, we will continue this chat through the year, but a lot of people are making some pretty big statements at the moment, and they can't all be right, is what I would say. Any more thoughts, Francis? If I turn to final thoughts,
Well I think just one dom which is that of course the other angle of all of this which is being perhaps underexplored is just the extent of the human cost of this. I'm always very very struck that when diplomats are talking about the Ukraine issue it seems to be always in the frame of military and political
priorities and of course that makes sense in many other ways but I think that really the sense of moral outrage that should still be very much in place if not more so has to a certain extent been lost or at least eroded over the past three years and this is always the danger with war is that you in a sense adapt to it and your moral universe changes the fact is we now know so much more
about what has been going on in the occupied territories than we knew months into the war, even a year into the war. And yet it seems to me that many politicians who quite openly talk about the idea of negotiations which might see territory ceded, do not really know what that means for the individuals who live
in that territory and of course over the Christmas period we broadcast several interviews from our time in Harkith where we spoke to people who lived in the occupied territories, who lived under indeed in the case of one lady under the Russian heel for weeks and the horrors that they endured are really
so egregious in the 21st century context, indeed in any context I would argue, that this should be something that is very much at the forefront of our minds. And so when politicians talk freely and liberally about the idea of a good peace, a lasting peace that involves negotiations and territory ceded,
I think really it should be on the onus of all of us to make sure that they are aware what that really means and so at the very least need to be able to articulate why they think that it is worth signing people's lives away to such horrors for the good of the continent and if they can't make a convincing argument for that that really all that they're trying to do is end a war that is expensive and bloody
then I would say that it is not really good enough in moral terms if nothing else. So I think that's another aspect of the war that should be on the forefront of our minds and yet really isn't. And I think that was clear again over the Christmas period with not masses of reflections, as you were talking about, Dom on the 30th, by our world leaders to be talking about the moral outrage that is continuing to take place all of the time as a consequence of Russia's invasion.
Okay, let's now move to final thoughts. I've got a couple for you, Francis, if I may. I note with interest, Russia's ban crypto mining in 10 regions of the country. So this comes from state media outlet RT, formerly Russia today. They're reporting that regions, including southern areas bordering Georgia, such as Dagestan, Ingershetia, North Ossetia, and Chechnya, but also what RT called the new Russian regions of Donetsk, Luhanza, Parisian, and Hezon,
Someone's gonna have to actually have a word of them telling them they don't hold all that land. They're saying that crypto mining's been banned there from yesterday to March the 15th. All right, no, March the 15th, 2031. It's very, very specific, a long, long term plan this. Now, last year, you may remember Putin signed legislation. Last year, Putin signed legislation legalizing cryptocurrency mining, but that activity is hugely power hungry.
and the Russian energy grid is apparently just not up to it, almost as if his energy officials hadn't been telling him the truth about how good the infrastructure was and whether it can actually handle all the mining when he called for such things just a few months ago. Anyway, RT, of course, said nothing of that and said the ban was part of, quote, broader efforts to manage energy resources efficiently and address power shortages while accommodating industrial requirements.
I think that shorthand for our energy grid is woeful. The loss of the European business means the heavily subsidised domestic market is up the swanney and all these Ukrainian drones hacks aren't helping. But very interesting I thought there that crypto mining so soon after being announced with not a huge amount of fanfare but Putin said it and then just a few months later they're having to ban it.
Thoughts on that, folks? I'm right on the edge of my jigsaw here when it comes to crypto mining. I'm aware that it's incredibly power-hungry. Do you think that is the reason? Is that because the energy infrastructure is so poor? Is that one of the reasons or the main reason why it's being banned? Please let us know.
And the last one for me, Francis, I've worked out why I've been sanctioned by Russia. I can't talk for you as well, but I've worked out why I've been sanctioned. I note that Russia has fined seven people for, quote, looking to gay, unquote.
after police raid on a nightclub last February in Tula. Police charge these detainees with, quote, trying to arouse interest in non-traditional sexual relations. That's been a crime since 2013 after what's commonly referred to as Russia's anti-gay law.
Although that is usually directed at anyone publishing pro LGBT material, not just for an individual's choice of clothing. But independent news site Verstka, they've done some analysis on court records that show this group of people. One man was held for having
crosses of black tape glued to his nipples and a women's style corset on his naked body. Another person had, oh here we go, blimey, another person had pink socks and an unbuttoned kimono over his shoulders, his hair was dyed bright orange and red tattoos on his face.
Now, the court description read, although a man, he was wearing a short top covering his chest, black leather shorts above the knee on which there were several chain-shaped ornaments and fishnet tights. Judges are reported to have said, the appearance of the detainees is inconsistent with the image of a man of traditional sexual orientation. I mean, it's just, it would be laughable if it wasn't so serious. I mean, this is backward. I mean, what's going on in this country?
But anyway, why, so why me? Why have I been sanctioned? Well, France is probably because someone's found the photos of me at the fancy dress party when I went as a roller skating bunny girl waitress wearing a black satin corset with fishnet stockings. One of my finest moments, I think, the dressing up box came up Trump's that night. Anyway, I just thought that was just so stupid. And but God, is that, is that where the country is? Anyway, for instance, final thoughts, please.
Well, thanks, Don. It might be time to dust off that costume because Eurovision is coming up. We're in 2025, after all. It's not too far away. But I want to end with another tragically absurd policy coming out of Moscow. And this is being reported by Ukraine's National Resistance Centre. They're saying that Russian authorities in the occupied territories have banned any mention of St. Nicholas in educational institutions.
To quote them, they say the administrations of preschools and educational institutions in the occupied territories of Ukraine have been instructed to ban even the mention of St. Nicholas. At all events, only grandfather Frost and the Snowmaiden, traditional Russian characters, must be present. In addition, a complete ban on carols and nativity scenes have been introduced.
The invaders recently held preventative discussions with the children to discredit Santa and other fairytale figures from Western cultures. It's a sort of behaviour as shocking as it is that we've come, of course, to expect.
from Russia but not only in this war but indeed over the course of the 20th century. I think it's a little known fact that Christmas as a religious holiday. I think I'm already saying was officially banned in 1929 as part of the Soviet efforts to stamp out religion and religious influences. The state was to be of course all powerful and anything that might be considered a threat to that as well as being seen as backward and not progressive was to be destroyed
And so if you read books of accounts of people who grew up in the Soviet Union, particularly around the 1920s, 1930s, this was very, very common. Churches were being destroyed, traditions being eradicated. And indeed, of course, what was most vicious was the erasure of local customs in those countries that were not originally part of, let's say, central Russia, but were on the periphery and are now since become their own independent countries. But
Now, as then, I would argue that any attempts to eradicate Santa in the occupied territories will fail, and indeed, as we see across Europe, those territories that were formerly the Soviet Union, Christmas is very much alive and kicking despite the state's best efforts. So perhaps a little bit of optimism in which to start 2025.
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