75: Compromised Comms

The story of Aldrich Ames, a CIA officer who became a spy for the Russians by offering information initially for money but eventually ended up betraying his fellow agents leading to their deaths. The story highlights how greed and a desire for money led Ames to abuse his position of trust. Similarly, in the case of the Iranian mole hunt, officials were looking for a mole who leaked information to American officials using their sources. These stories reveal how espionage and information leaks can have real-world consequences, and trust and integrity are critical in intelligence agencies, and the consequences of their absence can be severe.

The CIA spies on Iran through recruiting and handling people outside of the country due to the absence of American diplomatic facilities in Iran. The CIA sends and receives information through a super-secret website that looks like one thing but is actually a CIA back channel. Agents communicate with their assets inside Iran through covert communications that require them to download end-to-end encryption messaging apps. The CIA disguises the websites as something else based on an agent's interests, like a yoga website or book website. The different types of people involved in CIA spying include agents, agent handlers, analysts, assets, sources, and targeting officers. Overall, the CIA's espionage activities in Iran require various roles and strategies to gather information and maintain secrecy.

The CIA's covert communication system had flaws which were identified by a whistleblower named John Reidy, but they were not taken seriously. This resulted in a double agent in Iran having access to multiple covert CIA communication channels, which allowed Iran to uncover a vast network of sources within their country and abroad. Iran then used the information gathered to trail and surveil CIA agents and their handlers. This emphasizes the need for organizations to take whistleblowers seriously and address potential flaws in their systems, as failure to do so can result in disastrous consequences.

The discovery of a double-agent and sharing of counterintelligence information by Iran led to the capture, imprisonment, and killing of dozens of CIA assets and agents worldwide. Iran shared this information with their allies and adversaries, including China, which resulted in the death of several sources in China as well. The impact of this catastrophe was severe, affecting nearly 70% of the CIA's global operations, and the extent of its reach is still unknown. This event raises questions about why it was not considered an act of war and why it was not made public at the time. The tragedy underscores the importance of counterintelligence and the high degree of trust required in sharing such information.

The CIA operates in secrecy, and it is hard to get information on its operations, including investigations into intelligence failures. There were news articles about the killing of CIA informants by China and possibly Iran, but the US government did not publicly acknowledge the situation or indict the officials responsible. The former House Intel Chair, Mike Rogers, disclosed that he investigated a communication blip within the CIA and helped fix the problem. The investigation had to be kept confidential, as any public disclosure could further reveal the CIA's sources and agents. A former CIA officer, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, was arrested on charges of mishandling classified information, including names and contact information of CIA informants and agents in China. The technical problems and possible mole caused many sources to be identified and killed, leading to much debate and study about which failures were more to blame.

The intelligence community uses technology to communicate with sources, but the CIA's covert communication system was not secure. The system was relied upon so heavily for contact with sources that there needs to be a significant reevaluation of that process. In addition, there are not enough defenses for contractors in the intelligence community to be able to lodge complaints of retaliation, as seen with the whistleblower John Reidy's story. Even five years later, the issue continues to plague the agency, and there are still unanswered questions in the story. The CIA doesn't want the spotlight on them, but there needs to be a public exploration of the way that the intelligence community is using its technology.